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Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.1

*
Author’s note. Many thanks to the participants at both the University of Dayton School of Law
Faculty Colloquium and the University of Dayton Law and Education Symposium on Lemon, and
in particular, thanks to Professor Carlos Bernal and Professor Jeff Schmitt for their helpful comments on
this paper.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. I. (emphasis added).
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INTRODUCTION

This Article arises out of the University of Dayton Law and
Education Symposium: Lemon at 50: Has the Supreme Court Soured on
Its Bitter Fruits?2 For the symposium, I was asked to address Lemon:
The Past. In doing so, I took it as my charge to evaluate whether the
Lemon Test was justified by what came before it. In doing so, I looked to see
what justified the decision in that case. Was the rule justified by precedent,
the original mischief the Establishment Clause was meant to address,
the Founder’s views, the Framer’s original intent, or the original public
meaning of the text? 3 Or does a search into the history lead us
to the proverbial empty vessel?4 Is that what the Framer’s intended to give us
all along?
The Establishment Clause is not merely open textured but is, in fact,
opaque.5 This is because, on top of the fact that there were multiple views of
what an establishment of religion was, as the Court noted in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, the framers did not merely forbid Congress from the
establishment of religion but from making laws respecting

2
University of Dayton School of Law, Lemon at 50: Has the Supreme Court Soured on Its
Bitter Fruits? (Sept. 24, 2021), https://udayton.edu/law/events/education-conference.php.
3
I take these to be the range of backward-looking approaches for justifying a particular legal test
that is constructed to give effect to a broad constitutional duty and its corresponding right. Most of these
are one or another form of originalism. While looking to precedent is backward looking, it may or may
not be consistent with an originalist understanding of the Clause. While precedent, like history and
tradition, are not necessarily sufficient reasons for justifying a standard or test at the Supreme Court level,
tests that are well grounded in precedent, like those grounded in an unbroken history and tradition
do provide some level of consistency, stability, and predictability to the law. Although I am putting on
an “originalist” hat, or rather, a range of “originalist” hats, I am not arguing that originalism is a necessary
or sufficient justification for a given constitutional test or standard. Where originalist understandings
deeply undermine, or conflict with, democratic equality and the rule of law, they should give way to these
more fundamental principles underlying our contemporary constitutional democracy.
4
See, e.g., Josh Blackman & Ilya Shapiro, Is Justice Scalia Abandoning Originalism?, CATO
INSTITUTE (Mar. 9, 2010), https://www.cato.org/commentary/justice-scalia-abandoning-originalism
(“Justice Antonin Scalia holds himself out as the patron saint of originalism, the idea that judges should
interpret the Constitution according to its original public meaning. To do otherwise, he adds, is to succumb
to government by black‐robed philosopher‐kings who fill the empty vessel of a ‘living Constitution’
with their own policy preferences.”); see also American Constitution Society, Justices Breyer and Scalia
Converse on the Constitution at 34:40, YOUTUBE (Nov 22, 2013), https://youtu.be/9uk110w08_s
(Justice Scalia uses the metaphor of the empty bottle).
5
Establishment Clause, CORNELL L., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/establishment_clause
(last visited June 12, 2022). H.L.A. Hart tells us that the English language and the rules we create are
naturally open-textured. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (2d ed. 1994); Hart distinguishes those
things that fall within the core of a given rule (the settled meaning), which might be decided by looking
at ordinary meaning, logic, and those things that fall into the penumbra which require additional premises,
e.g., the purpose of the rule. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARVARD
L. REV. 593, 607 (1958). The Clause is opaque because it is not clear what the core meaning of the
Clause is. The Clause is vague at best. See infra Section V. Because of this vagueness, the text is not
capable of direct application, but like the free speech provisions, must be mediated by doctrine that is
constructed. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 453, 468–472 (2013). As Solum further notes, while interpretation may be a factual matter,
construction is normative, and there is a vast array of normative approaches to constructing doctrine under
these circumstances. Id. at 472.
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such establishments.6 There is no evidence in the historical record to suggest
that the term respecting had a meaning at the time of the Founding that was
different from today. Then, as today, it means “relating to, having a reference
to.”7 It is not that the meaning of respecting is completely unclear,
for it clearly enlarges the scope of the phrase it modifies. What is unclear,
and what the “plain meaning” leaves open, is how far it enlarges the scope
of the prohibition. There is a multitude of steps that the government may
take in the direction of, or that are related to, establishing a religion that falls
short of establishing an official government religion like the Church of
England.8 But, further, as we see, the term “establishment of religion” itself
was used in a variety of ways, by various actors, at the time of the Founding
that ranged from requiring almost complete separation to accommodating and
even financing religion.9 Thus, these few words of text provide us little
guidance as to the Clause’s scope. What steps are enough, and what steps
are too de minimis to trigger Establishment Clause concerns? What things are
6
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). This proposition finds support in McGowan, where
Chief Justice Warren for the court stated:
But, the First Amendment, in its final form, did not simply bar a congressional enactment establishing
a church; it forbade all laws respecting an establishment of religion. Thus, this Court has given the
Amendment a “broad interpretation . . . in the light of its history and the evils it was designed forever
to suppress. . . .”
366 U. S. 420, 441–42 (1961) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1947). This might
still be read to at least limit the Clause to legislation. For better or worse this would require limiting the
rest of the First Amendment in the same way, and this has never been the case. Governmental conduct,
in addition to laws, can violate the First Amendment.
7
Respect, JOHN ASH, THE NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed.
1795); see also Respecting, SAMUEL JOHNSON, FOLIO EDITION OF A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1755), https://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/views/search.php?term=respecting (“Relation;
regard. In respect of the suitors which attend you, do them what right in justice, and with as much speed
as you may. Bacon.”); see also Respecting, WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1828), http://www.webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/respecting (“RESPECT'ING,
participle present tense Regarding; having regard to; relating to.”). According to the Court in Lemon,
the Founders forbade inchoate steps in the direction of the establishment of religion. Lemon, 403 U.S.
at 612. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines “respecting” as “[w]ith reference to, with
regard to, concerning.” Respecting, THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2565 (Lesley
Brown Eds. 1993).
8
Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause: Its Original Public Meaning and What We Can Learn
From the Plain Text, 22 FED. SOC. REV. 26, 34–35 (2021). The word “respect” comes from the Latin
to look back “re- + specere.” THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 7.
9
Daniel L. Dreisbach, Defining and Testing the Prohibition on Religious Establishments in the Early
Republic, in NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION: AMERICA’S ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY 252, 253 (T. Jeremey Gunn & John Witte, Jr. eds., 2012). One might think the meaning of the
text is plain in forbidding laws that would establish an official religion, as in England’s established church.
While this much is plain, most everyone concedes that the term “establishment of religion” was understood
to be broader than this. Establishment Clause, supra note 5. Numerous types of laws might be passed
to support one religion without ever actually establishing an official religion. As Dreisbach notes,
“The definition of establishment varied from region to region and denomination to denomination.”
Dreisbach, supra, at 253. Drakeman notes that the term was also used in America to describe the practices
of imposing taxes to fund churches by both those who opposed such taxes (such as Evangelicals, Baptists
and Founders like James Madison) and those who supported such institutions in Massachusetts and in
Connecticut. DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT 217–24 (2010) (citing
Avery v. Tyringham, 3 Mass. 160 (1807) (an opinion by Sedgwick, J.); Barnes v. Inhabitants of the First
Parish, 6 Mass. 401 (1810) (an opinion by Parsons, J.)). As he notes later in the book, while he might agree
with Michael McConnell that everyone at the time of the founding knew what the expression meant,
he does not agree that they all thought it meant the same thing. Id. at 228.
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sufficiently “related to” an establishment of religion to come within its terms?
This raises the question, to paraphrase the words of Justice Scalia,
is the Establishment Clause just an empty vessel to be filled up with whatever
meaning each generation gives to it or is there some fixed original meaning
that each generation is bound to respect until the Constitution is amended?10
As the title suggests, and as this Article will demonstrate,
the language the Framers landed on provides us little more than an empty
vessel. Historians, legal academics, and judges have sometimes filled
that vessel using originalist arguments, but there does not appear to be any
consensus on what that content should be.11 One can find historical support
for a wide range of views on the Clause, running from the strict wall of
separation view to the accommodationist view.12 Our Founding Fathers had
a range of views on religion and the relationship between church and state, as
did those who drafted and voted for the Clause.13 Unfortunately,
the legislative history and debates do not meaningfully limit or define the
scope or meaning of the Clause.14 They do not point to a single purpose or
set of mischiefs the Clause was meant to protect against, much less a common
understanding of its scope and meaning.15 A search for the commonly
10
See American Constitution Society, supra note 4, at 34:40. Note that Justice Felix Franfurter
referenced the empty vessel metaphor in the context of statutory interpretation back in 1947. As he stated,
statutes are not “empty vessels into which he [the judge] can pour anything he wants—his caprices, fixed
notions, even statesmanlike beliefs in a particular policy.” Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the
Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 529 (1947).
11
See generally id.
12
First Amendment: Establishment Clause, CONST. L. REP., https://constitutionallawreporter.com/
amendment-01/establishment-clause/ (last visited June 12, 2022).
13
See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, Is this a Christian Nation?: An Introduction, 26 ROGER WILLIAMS U.L.
REV. 237, 243–57 (2021).
14
See Hana M. Ryman & J. Mark Alcorn, Establishment Clause (Separation of Church and State),
MIDDLE TENN. STATE UNIV.: FREE SPEECH CTR., https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/885/
establishment-clause-separation-of-church-and-state (last visited June 12, 2022).
15
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer argues that
the chief purpose of the Clause was to avoid religious divisiveness, in particular “that divisiveness based
upon religion that promotes social conflict, sapping the strength of government and religion alike.”
Id. (citing Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,717–29 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting). For the
argument that this is not the mischief the Clause was meant to correct, see generally Richard W. Garnett,
Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667 (2006). Others, like Justice Thomas,
argue that the purpose was to limit the ability of the Federal Government from establishing religion and
from interfering with state establishments. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“The text and history of the Establishment Clause strongly suggest that it is
a federalism provision intended to prevent Congress from interfering with state establishments.”); see also
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 32–34 (1998).
Noah Feldman argues that the purpose of the Establishment Clause was to protect liberty of conscience.
As he states, “Violent religious persecution did not loom large in the minds of the Framers, who intended
the Establishment Clause to protect the liberty of conscience of religious dissenters against paying taxes to
support religious beliefs with which they disagreed.” Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality:
The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 675 (2002)
(citing Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346
(2002)). Andrew Koppelman argues that Justice Brennan, who was not a proclaimed originalist, asked
the correct originalist question when he held that the “Court should ask whether challenged practices
‘threaten those consequences which the Framers deeply feared; whether, in short, they tend to promote that
type of interdependence between religion and state which the First Amendment was designed to prevent.’”
Andrew M. Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 727, 740
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accepted public meaning of the Clause, even through meta-data searches
of thousands of documents from the period, turns up scant evidence of
the Clause’s meaning.16 The Framer’s chosen language, “respecting an
establishment of religion,” does not turn up anywhere in the Corpus of
Early Modern English, from 1475–1790, nor the Corpus of Founding Era
American English from 1760–1789.17 In other words, there is no evidence
that the expression was ever used prior to the final version of the Amendment
sent out for ratification. There is no record anywhere of anyone debating or
even defending that exact language before it was voted up. What is the
original public meaning of an expression that does not appear to have ever
been used, much less discussed or debated?18
To determine if the Lemon test is justified by its past, this Article
begins by looking at how the Court in Lemon chose to justify its interpretation
of the Clause. As we will see, the Court largely grounded its decision
in precedent.19 In this regard, the Court’s opinion finds ample support in
the cases it cites.20 Lemon was not a groundbreaking case that went where no
court had gone before. Rather, the Court in Lemon largely synthesized
a three-pronged rule from earlier cases.21 Lemon finds its justification in over
twenty years of precedent, starting with Everson v. Board of Education
in 1947.22 Of course, this begs the question as to whether the Court’s decision
in Everson was well-founded. Unlike the Court in Lemon, the Court in
Everson did justify its opinion based on the views of the Founders, and it used
the views of prominent historians to buttress its position.23 Thus, this Article
will spend some time addressing this case and the criticisms of the case, and
(2009) (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 236 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
16
See generally, Law and Corpus Linguistics, BYU LAW, http://lawcorpus.byu.edu (last visited
June 12, 2022).
17
This database contains over 40,000 texts and 1.1 billion words. The database spans 1475 to 1800.
There are only 13 entries that contain this exact language, and they all postdate the Amendment. Id.
The Corpus of Founding Era American English, which covers 1760–1799, has 20 entries with this exact
language. Here, the first entry begins in 1789 with the Amendment as it is voted up by the First Congress.
Id.
18
Note, there is no recorded debate or discussion regarding this final language as it came out of
Congress and was proposed to the states for ratification.
19
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 611–14 (1971).
20
Id. at 611–17.
21
Id. at 612.
22
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
23
Id. at 11–14. This is true of both the majority (relying on the views of Charles Beard) and
the dissent (relying on the view of Irving Brant). DRAKEMAN, supra note 9, at 143, 145–46.
[O]ne of originalism’s most durable and visible manifestations—namely, the use of
Madison, Jefferson, and colonial Virginia to interpret the establishment clause—has
venerable roots not merely in the advocacy of self-interested litigants offering up
bits of history to bolster their claims but in distinguished historians who were not
shy about presenting clear historical answers to complex constitutional questions.
Highly regarded historians actively promoted originalism as an interpretive
methodology for the establishment clause, and they supplied a favored version of
the history itself, in this case, an oversimplified Virginia-centric First Amendment
creation myth.
Id. at 146.
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the history that the Justices invoke in support of their opinions. This takes us
from the somewhat limited view of a few influential Founding Fathers to that
of the framers of the Amendment. As noted, this does not turn out to be a very
fruitful exercise if we are seeking a common or single understanding of the
Clause. It barely fills out the contours of the bottle, much less its full content.
As we will see, if the scope is broadened further to the use of meta-data,
the results are no more determinative. Thus, we still have an empty vessel.
Contrary to the views of some, history neither provides us with a solid basis
for critiquing the Lemon Test nor does it provide us a recipe for filling
the vessel and providing an alternative test. For that, we must look elsewhere.
II.

THE LEMON COURT AND ITS JUSTIFICATION FOR THE LEMON TEST:
PRECEDENT

The Court in Lemon did not claim to derive the meaning of the Clause
from its plain meaning, nor did it reference the views of the Founding Fathers,
or even the framers of the Clause.24 Rather, the Court largely relied
on precedent to identify the mischief the Clause was meant to address and
the standards it would set.25 The Court went so far as to acknowledge that
“[c]andor compels acknowledgment, moreover, that we can only dimly
perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area
of constitutional law.”26 Drawing on its decision the previous year
in Walz v. Tax Commission, the Court claimed to derive the Lemon Test from
the three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended
to afford protection: “sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement
of the sovereign in religious activity.”27 The Court further claimed to derive
its Test from the “cumulative criteria developed by the Court over
many years.”28 The three-part Test is as follows: “First, the statute must have
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be

24
See generally Lemon, 403 U.S. 602. The concurrence of Douglas, joined by Justice Black,
did discuss the views of Jefferson and Madison. See id. at 630, 633–34 (Douglas & Black, JJ., concurring).
25
Id. at 612.
26
Id.
27
Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). Note that the Lemon Court
does not explain or attempt to justify this choice of evils beyond citing Walz. Walz provided a description
of the evils in the following terms:
In England, and in some Colonies at the time of the separation in 1776, the Church
of England was sponsored and supported by the Crown as a state, or established,
church; in other countries “establishment” meant sponsorship by the sovereign of
the Lutheran or Catholic Church. The exclusivity of established churches in the
17th and 18th centuries, of course, was often carried to prohibition of other forms
of worship.
Walz, 397 U.S. at 668 (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 428 n.10 (1962); C. ANTIEAU, ET AL.,
FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT (1964); Everson, 330 U.S. at 9–11; L. PFEFFER, CHURCH,
STATE AND FREEDOM 71 ET SEQ. (1967)).
28
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
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one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not
foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”29
Although Lemon has been applied well beyond its original context,
it is worth remembering that the cases leading up to Lemon, as well as the
cases cited in Lemon, were nearly all cases involving schools.30 Although the
Court cites Board of Education v. Allen, which upheld a textbook loan
program to parochial schools in 1968, for the first two prongs of the Test,
that formulation can be found five years earlier in School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp, a case striking down a school prayer law.31
Schempp reached back to the 1961 case of McGowan v. Maryland and the
1947 case of Everson v. Board of Education to support its formulation
of the rule.32 McGowen, in fact, relies on Everson for its rule.33 The third
prong finds support in Walz v. Tax Commission, where the Court upheld
a tax exemption for religious organizations, in part because it did not involve
excessive entanglement by the government in religious matters.34 Lemon is
really just a case that synthesizes these previous rules into a three-pronged
test. Thus, Lemon is solidly rooted in precedent. Following precedent
furthers democratic rule of law principles of treating similar cases alike and
provides stability and predictability. Precedent should not be lightly
29
Id. at 612–13 (first citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) for the first and second
prongs; then quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674 for the third prong).
30
John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 279, 294 (2001). It is worth noting that while there were issues surrounding government funding
of religion, the Framers did not live in a world of government funded education. See, e.g., id.
31
374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). The Schempp Test was stated as follows:
[W]hat are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to
withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
Id. (citing Everson, 330 U.S. 1; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)).
32
Id. at 219. McGowan upheld Sunday closing laws based on their secular purpose and effect.
McGowan, 366 U.S. at 422–44. And Everson upheld the transportation expenses reimbursement program
for children attending both public schools and parochial schools based on its secular purpose and effect.
Everson, 330 U.S. at 17–18.
33
McGowan, 366 U.S. at 442–44.
34
Walz, 397 U.S. at 676. Although the third prong of Lemon finds its origin in the case, Chief Justice
Burger writing for the Court, justified the decision using all three prongs of the subsequent Lemon Test.
Id. at 669, 672–73, 676–77. As he stated, “Each value judgment under the Religion Clauses must therefore
turn on whether particular acts in question are intended to establish or interfere with religious beliefs and
practices or have the effect of doing so.” Id. at 669. He then went on to state: “The legislative purpose
of the property tax exemption is neither the advancement nor the inhibition of religion; it is neither
sponsorship nor hostility.” Id. at 672. The Court finds the state’s secular purpose to be the “stabilizing
influences in community life” that these groups provide. Id. at 673. Note that the Court also justified
the lack of entanglement on the widespread and long-standing practice of tax exemptions for religious
organizations across all fifty states and enactments of Congress dating back to 1802. Id. at 676–77.
As the Court noted, “It appears that at least up to 1885 this Court, reflecting more than a century of our
history and uninterrupted practice, accepted without discussion the proposition that federal or state grants
of tax exemption to churches were not a violation of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.” Id. at
680. Note further, that Justice Brennan also claims to take a view that is faithful to the Founding Fathers.
Id. at 680–700 (Brennan, J., concurring). Note also Justice Douglas’s dissent. Id. at 719–35 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
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overruled unless the precedent is erroneous and is either unworkable or results
in undermining other fundamental democratic principles. As Randy Barnett,
one of the most influential new originalists argues,
there is much room for the doctrine of precedent in
originalism. It is not incompatible with original public
meaning originalism to adhere to precedent in cases
involving (a) nonconstitutional issues, (b) matters of
constitutional construction, (c) detrimental reliance by
identifiable individuals, (d) epistemic concerns about the
correctness of originalist claims, and perhaps also (e) where
the text was originally ambiguous.35
As the remainder of this Article will demonstrate, not only is the text
originally ambiguous, but there are serious epistemic concerns regarding the
correctness of originalist claims when it comes to the Establishment Clause.
Thus, under Barnett’s framework, relying on precedent in this case is not
inconsistent with originalism.
This still begs the question as to whether these prongs have a deeper
pedigree. Are they rooted in our history and traditions? Are they consistent
with the text of the Constitution, the mischief the Framers were attempting to
address, their original intent, or at least the spirit and purport of the Clause?
III.

EVERSON AND THE CENTRALITY OF MADISON, JEFFERSON, AND
THE VIRGINIA TAX CONTROVERSY

As noted above, the cases cited in Lemon largely relied on the Court’s
reasoning in Everson v. Board of Education.36 Thus, as we trace back
the decision’s pedigree, it’s worth revisiting that case to see if the Court’s
opinion comports with the text, mischief, original intent, and/or spirit and
purport of the Clause. While Everson was a five to four decision ultimately
upholding the law that reimbursed school transportation expenses, no
one on the Court dissented from the decision to incorporate the
Establishment Clause; no one dissented from the majority’s view of the
mischief the Clause was meant to address, nor the roles of Madison and
Jefferson in the formation of the Clause, and the relevance of their views
on Virginia’s plan to tax its citizens to support the church.37 Moreover, no

35
Randy Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not As Radical As It Sounds,
22 CONST. COMMENT 257, 269 (2005).
36
See, e.g., McGowan, 366 U.S. at 461, 467; Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952);
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 493 (1961).
37
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18–74 (1947) (Jackson & Rutledge, JJ., dissenting).
Justice Rutledge, in his dissent, further noted that
[i]n Madison's own words characterizing Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom, the guaranty he put in our national charter, like the bill he piloted through
the Virginia Assembly, was “a Model of technical precision, and perspicuous
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one on the Court argued that the Court’s standard went too far or worked too
strictly on a separation of church and state.38 If anything, the dissent argued
that the majority did not go far enough to maintain the wall of separation in its
standards, particularly in applying its standards to the facts.39 Those standards
were as follows:
The “establishment of religion” clause of the
First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence
a person to go to or to remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in
any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations
or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson,

brevity.” Madison could not have confused “church” and “religion,” or “an
established church’ and ‘an establishment of religion.”
Id. at 31 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (citing IX WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 288 (Hunt ed., 1910); SAUL
PADOVER, JEFFERSON 74 (1942)). Madison's characterization related to Jefferson's entire revision of the
Virginia Code, of which the Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom was a part. See id. at 35 n.15 (note that
Justice Rutledge, like the other dissents, dissented primarily on the facts and not the law).
Justice Rutledge's dissenting opinion “merely restated Justice Black's account . . . with different emphasis.”
AMERICA IN THEORY 18 (Leslie Berlowitz et al. eds., 1988).
38
See generally Everson, 330 U.S. 1.
39
Justice Jackson largely dissented on the facts. See id. at 19–20, 25 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
In addition to arguing that the Court did not “apply the principles it avows,” he argued that merely because
the state claimed the law had a public purpose did not make it so. Id. at 25–26. He endorsed
Justice Rutledge’s dissent when he said, “the effect of the religious freedom Amendment to our
Constitution was to take every form of propagation of religion out of the realm of things which could
directly or indirectly be made public business and thereby be supported in whole or in part at taxpayers'
expense.” Id. at 26. Justice Rutledge argued that
[t]he Amendment's purpose was not to strike merely at the official establishment of
a single sect, creed or religion, outlawing only a formal relation such as had
prevailed in England and some of the colonies. Necessarily it was to uproot all such
relationships. But the object was broader than separating church and state in this
narrow sense. It was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres
of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form
of public aid or support for religion. In proof the Amendment's wording and history
unite with this Court's consistent utterances whenever attention has been fixed
directly upon the question.
Id. at 31–32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect “a wall of separation between church and
State .”40
The majority draws attention to the religious persecution in Europe
by and against Catholics and the various Protestant sects, as well
as the persecution of Jews by the former, and the continuation of those
practices through religious establishments in America.41 Those in the
minority in any given locality were treated horribly, according to the Court.
They were persecuted, jailed for their beliefs, and forced to attend services,
not to mention to pay tithes and taxes that went to government-sponsored
churches and pay for ministers’ salaries.42 The Court reports that
“[t]hese practices became so commonplace as to shock the freedom-loving
colonials into afeeling of abhorrence.”43
While the historical facts regarding persecution, both in Europe and
in the Colonies, are well documented in the historical record, the conclusion
that this “shock[ed] the freedom-loving colonials” is not so well supported.44
40
Everson, 330 U.S. at 15–16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 164 (1878)).
Note that the amicus briefs of both the National Councils of Catholic Men and Women and the American
Civil Liberty Union (“ACLU”) adopted Jefferson’s wall of separation metaphor. DRAKEMAN, supra
note 9, at 95–98. The Catholic brief argued that non-preferential aid to religious organizations did not
violate the historical understanding of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 95. On the one hand, the Catholic
brief argued that the wall was there to stop government from compelling believers and non-believers
in matters of belief as well as to stop the Church from compelling conformity to its beliefs as a
“condition of full citizenship . . . .” Id. at 96 (quoting LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENT OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 960 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds. 1975) [hereinafter
LANDMARK BRIEFS]). The ACLU, on the other hand, argued for a “complete separation of church and
state.” Id. at 94 (quoting LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra, at 852).
41
Id. at 9–10 (citing BAMBINGTON MACAULAY, 1 HISTORY OF ENGLAND, chs. 2, 4 (1849); 5 THE
CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, chs. V, IX, XI (1908); 1 CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY RITTER BEARD,
RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION, 60 (1933); STANFORD H. COBB, RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN
AMERICA chs. II (1902); WILLIAM W. SWEET, THE STORY OF RELIGION IN AMERICA chs. II (1939);
WILLIAM W. SWEET, RELIGION IN COLONIAL AMERICA 320–22 (1942)).
42
Id. at 10.
43
Id. at 11. The Court referenced the following letter from Madison to a friend in 1774 in support of
this view:
That diabolical, hell-conceived principle of persecution rages among some . . . .
This vexes me the worst of anything whatever. There are at this time in the adjacent
country not less than five or six well-meaning men in close jail for publishing their
religious sentiments, which in the main are very orthodox. I have neither patience
to hear, talk, or think of anything relative to this matter; for I have squabbled and
scolded, abused and ridiculed, so long about it to little purpose, that I am without
common patience. So I must beg you to pity me, and pray for liberty of conscience
to all.
See id. at 11 n.9 (quoting 1 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 18, 21 (1900)).
44
See DRAKEMAN, supra note 9, at 110–13. As he states,
In painting this broad landscape depicting widespread persecution and governmental
support of the churches, Justice Black thus drew from a wide range of distinguished
historians, and his footnotes evidence an impressively documented study of the
well-known and certainly in this context noncontroversial aspects of the history
of religious freedom (or lack thereof) in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe
and America. But at this point in the historical narrative, Black needs to link this
general background with the First Amendment, and the learned historians on whom
he has been relying are unable to help.
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The Court proceeded to note that while no one group or locality
should be given credit for having “aroused the sentiment that culminated in
[the] adoption of the Bill of Rights’ provisions embracing religious liberty,”
Virginia provided a great stimulus to the idea.45 The Court then turned its
attention to the controversy in Virginia over the plan to tax its citizens to
support religious institutions.46 The particular focus was on the efforts of
Madison and Jefferson to quash those efforts and to establish religious liberty
in the state. In addition to appending Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance
and quoting at length from Jefferson’s Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty,
the Court spent several pages elucidating the views of Madison and Jefferson
on the subject.47 The preamble to the Virginia Bill reads in part: “[T]hat to
compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation
of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; that even the
forcing him to support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is
depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the
particular pastor, whose morals he would make his pattern . . . .”48
The Court then argued that the First Amendment’s religion clauses
had the same objective and were intended to provide the same protections as
the Virginia statute.49 But it was not this Court alone that adopted the view.
The majority opinion traced back the pedigree of this idea all the way back to
the late 19th century in Reynolds v. United States, Watson v. Jones, and
Davis v. Beason.50

Id. at 111.
45
Everson, 330 U.S. at 11.
46
Id. Patrick Henry’s 1784 proposal was to levy a property tax on all citizens to support ministers
of recognized Christian sects. HOWARD GILLMAN & ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE RELIGION CLAUSES: THE
CASE FOR THE SEPARATING OF CHURCH AND STATE 31 (2020) (citing THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND
STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA 108–09 (1977)). This was somewhat non-preferential, but a more
clearly non-preferential amendment of the proposal was passed removing “Christian” from it, so that
it would or could included people of non-Christian faiths, that amendment was reversed, the justification
being that the tax was designed to keep Christian ministers, and in particular Episcopalian clergy solvent.
See id.; see also A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion, Washington Mss.
(Papers of George Washington, Vol. 231), Library of Congress, reprinted in Everson, 330 U.S. at app. II
at 72–74 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
47
See Letter from John Madison, to the Honorable General Assembly of the Commonwealth
of Virgina (1785) (on file with the Library of Congress), reprinted in Everson, 330 U.S. at app. I at 63–72
(Rutledge, J., dissenting); see also Everson, 330 U.S. at 12–13.
48
Everson, 330 U.S. at 13 (quoting DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 125 (Henry Steele
Commager ed., 1944)).
49
Id.
50
Id.; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 720 (1871);
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). After quoting Jefferson’s use of the wall of separation
metaphor, the Court stated:
Coming as this does from an acknowledged leader of the advocates of the measure,
it may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of
the amendment thus secured. Congress was deprived of all legislative power over
mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social
duties or subversive of good order.
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164. While the Jeffersonian wall of separation metaphor can be found in Reynolds
as defining the scope of the Clause, upon an admittedly cursory view of the Watson and Davis cases, it is
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Everson’s rendition of history and the centrality of Madison,
Jefferson, and Virginia has come under considerable attack over the years.51
Further, a number of scho ars have criticized the judges in the Everson case,
arguing that the Everson majority and dissenting opinions were based on
anti-Catholic sentiments.52
Finally, the case’s rather under-justified
not clear that they add any support to the Court’s assertion. Id.; Watson, 80 U.S. at 720; Davis, 133 U.S.
at 342.
51
See, e.g., John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193, 220–21 (1993) (“There are
no other decisions dealing with American constitutional law that owe more to violations of the canons of
historical interpretation than those dealing with the establishment and free exercise of religion. A ‘wall
of separation’ has been erected to create the doctrine of ‘Separation of Church and State,’ ostensibly based
on a letter Thomas Jefferson wrote to Baptist ministers in Connecticut. Historians have been amazed
at how this evidence meets no canon of relevancy. Jefferson . . . had no official connection with
the amendment of the Constitution that the Court was interpreting.” (footnotes omitted)); see also
Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 30, at 296–97 (“When the Everson Court reached back to Virginia for
the pedigree of modern separationism, the justices were not obeying a command from the Framers.
They were making a choice. The past they imagined in Everson seemed obvious, natural, and clear to them
because it fit so readily what they expected the Constitution to say.”); Robert G. Natelson, The Original
Meaning of the Establishment Clause, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 73, 136 (2005) (arguing that
“[t]he Establishment Clause was not crafted to reflect the notions of Jefferson or Madison or any other
small collection of individuals—not even the individuals who happened to sit in the First Congress.”);
DISESTABLISHMENT AND RELIGIOUS DISSENT: CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN THE NEW AMERICAN
STATES, 1776–1833, at 10–11, 16–17 (Carl H. Esbeck & Jonathan J. Den Hartog eds., 2019) (criticizing
the focus on Virginia’s disestablishment and noting “it cannot be said that the disestablishment story in any
one state was more important than that of others,” as well as criticizing the view that Jefferson had a broad
influence on the disestablishment process); James J. Knicely, “First Principles” and the Misplacement
of the “Wall of Separation”: Too Late in the Day for a Cure?, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 171, 172–73 (2004).
Everson's solemn invocation of Jefferson and Madison, and its commanding pronouncements from
the Virginia disestablishment battle—portrayed as the view subscribed to by most early Americans—
established a powerful doctrinal engine for a completely new regime of law in all of the states. The slow
but progressive revelation of its incomplete and distorted rendition of that history has produced, however,
not only a doctrine in need of justification, but a body of law with underpinnings that cannot long withstand
the absence of a legitimate rationale for decision.
Id. at 205 (footnotes omitted); see also DRAKEMAN, supra note 9, at 74–147.
52
Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 30, at 291 (“[W]e believe, as Justice Thomas charged, that
the constitutional prohibition against aid to religious schools is in some measure the sanitized residue
of nativism and anti-Catholic animosity.”); DRAKEMAN, supra note 9, at 103–05; PHILIP HAMBURGER,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 461–63 (2002). For the counter argument, see Robert D. Goldstein,
The Structural Wall of Separation and the Erroneous Claim of Anti-Catholic Discrimination, 13 CARDOZO
PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 173, 215–26 (2014) (criticizing Justice Thomas’s views, and the views of
Philip Hamburger). Contrary to Thomas and Hamburger, Goldstein argues that the motivation behind
the infamous Blaine Amendment was not hostility to the Catholic faith, but to papal authority, which was
viewed as illiberal and anti-democratic. Id. As he notes,
When liberal governments in Europe expelled Jesuits from Italy, Spain, Germany
and France between 1848 and 1880, a number of them immigrated to the U.S.
and carried forward their work here. These and other “orders emphasized loyalty
to the pope above national allegiance and had frequently allied themselves with
monarchies and conservative governments.”
Id. at 216 n.142 (citations omitted). As he further argues,
During this period, Americans expressed concern about the growing power of
the Pope. Opposing the ultramontane centralization of the Church, some American
Catholics employed anti-clerical and anti-papist rhetoric themselves. French
Catholics in Louisiana, for example, claimed in one instance that Irish Catholic
loyalty to the tyranny of the Pope is inconsistent with being “true Americans . . . .”
Id. at 216; see also Patrick W. Carey, American Catholics and the First Amendment: 1776–1840, 113 PA.
MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 323, 342 (1989) (describing Pope Gregory XVl’s 1832 encyclical Mirari Vos
which opposed “in principle and practice religious liberty, freedom of the press, and separation of church
and state.”). Alito’s concurrence in Espinoza recounts the anti-Catholic sentiment that led to the law
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incorporation of the Establishment Clause to the states in that case has also
come under attack.53
i.

Incorporation

Addressing this last point first, if the Establishment Clause never
should have been incorporated, then a large number of state and local cases
should never have been decided.54 Of course, there would still be a need to
understand the scope of the Clause vis-à-vis the federal government. So, was
there an original understanding that the Clause was designed to protect state
establishments from the federal government? As we will see in Section V
below, there is no clear evidence that anyone in the House of Representatives,
much less a majority of the members of the House took this view when they
debated the Clause.55 We do not know what was discussed in the Senate or
the conference committee, and the records of the state conventions are
generally thought to be even less useful than the House debates.56
There doesn’t appear to be any actual solid evidence for the view beyond the
argument that the term “respecting” can be read to mean that the federal laws

in that case. His opinion reads a bit like a “me too” for Catholics. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue,
140 S. Ct. 2246, 2267–74 (2020) (Alito, J., concurring).
53
See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477,
481 (1991) ("it is striking in retrospect to observe how little intellectual curiosity the members of the Court
demonstrated in the challenge presented by the task of adapting, for application to the states, language that
had long served to protect the states against the federal government.”); James M. O’Neil, Nonpreferential
Aid to Religion is not an Establishment of Religion, 2 BUFF. L. REV. 242, 244–45 (1952). Drakeman tells
us that that Edward Corwin thundered that “‘the Court has the right to make history . . . but it has no right
to make it up.’” Donald L. Drakeman, Everson v. Board of Education and the Quest for the Historical
Establishment Clause, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 120 (2007) (quoting EDWARD S. CORWIN,
A CONSTITUTION OF POWERS IN A SECULAR STATE 116 (1951)). For a review of Everson, see Daniel L.
Dreisbach, Everson and the Command of History: The Supreme Court, Lessons of History, and ChurchState Debate in America, in EVERSON REVISITED: RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND LAW AT THE CROSSROADS
(Jo Renee Formicola & Hubert Morken eds, 1997). For a Defense of Everson, see David M. Levitan,
Mr. Justice Rutledge, 34 VA. L. REV. 526, 533 (1948).
54
For attacks on the incorporation of the Establishment Clause, see for example, Jonathan P. Brose,
In Birmingham They Love the Governor: Why the Fourteenth Amendment Does Not Incorporate
the Establishment Clause, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1 (1998); Knicely, supra note 51, at 173; see also
Justice Thomas concurance in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, where he stated, “[I]n the context of the
Establishment Clause, it may well be that state action should be evaluated on different terms than similar
action by the Federal Government.” 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). In Elk Grove,
he went further and argued that the Clause was a federalism provision, which resists incorporation.
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45–46 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas argues that incorporating the Clause "prohibit[s] precisely what the Establishment Clause
was intended to protect—state establishments of religion." Id. at 52 (citation omitted). He reiterates these
points in his concurrence in Espinoza, where he states: “As I have explained in previous cases, at the
founding, the Clause served only to ‘protec[t] States, and by extension their citizens, from the imposition
of an established religion by the Federal Government.’” Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2263 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Under this view, the Clause resists incorporation against the States. See Town of Greece,
N.Y. v. Galloway, 572 U. S. 565, 604 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring). Even if this is true, it does not
follow that the Clause was designed to protect state establishments.
55
See infra Section V.
56
See infra Section V.
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that touch on or interfere with state establishments would be laws “respecting
an establishment of religion.”57
Donald Drakeman, in Church, State, and Original Intent, ends his
twenty page argument against the view that the original public meaning of
the Establishment Clause was that it was designed to prohibit the
Federal Government from interfering with state establishments with
a relatively devastating blow, namely, that candidates for “original public
meaning” must be “supported by evidence that somebody at the time
embraced that particular interpretation.”58 But, there is no such evidence, and
in fact, those who might have gained the most from the argument did not make
it before, during, or after the ratification.59
It is very unlikely that anyone believed that the draft, which stated
that “Congress shall make no law,” would ever apply to the states.60 But,
of course, that is also likely true of the rest of the rights in the Bill of Rights,
including the free speech provisions of the First Amendment.61 The fact that
some states still had established religions also supports the fact that no one
thought that the provision applied to the states.62 But this does not distinguish
the Establishment Clause from the Free Speech Clause, since most states did
not have provisions protecting free speech.63 Only Pennsylvania and Vermont
had provisions in their charters or bills of rights that protected free speech
generally.64 New York’s free speech provision, section 11 of its bill of rights,
did not provide a general right to free speech but merely a right that protected
57
As we will see below, the “respecting” language was only added at the end by the conference
committee and was not part of the drafts that either the House or the Senate sent to the committee. See infra
note 135 and accompanying text.
58
DRAKEMAN, supra note 9, at 247–48. Drakeman goes so far as to argue that there is more evidence
to support the view that the other rights provisions in the First Amendment should be resistant
to incorporation from the view of original intent than the Establishment Clause, since an Amendment from
Madison that would have guaranteed freedom of conscience, speech and press (among other things)
vis-à-vis the states was explicitly rejected. Id. at 245.
59
Drakeman notes that there is no record of the New England states, nor any other state, calling for the
enhanced protection against federal interference or to shield their ecclesiastical laws from federal
interference; there was no record of speeches, sermons, or newspaper articles calling for such protection,
and no record of New Englanders identifying their laws as “Establishments” even after the ratification.
Id. at 241–43. While a number of Framers made the general federalism argument that the Federal
Government had no enumerated power to regulate religion, it does not follow that the Establishment Clause
was designed to reinforce that view. As Drakeman notes, there is plenty of evidence that people during
the Founding Era did not want a federally established religion, there is no evidence that anyone was seeking
extra protection for existing state establishments. Id.
60
Id. at 241.
61
See id.
62
See DISESTABLISHMENT AND RELIGIOUS DISSENT, supra note 51, at 40.
63
Christopher J. Roederer, Free Speech on the Law School Campus: Is it the Hammer or the Wrecking
Ball that Speaks?, 15 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 26, 42 n.64 (2018).
64
Pennsylvania and Vermont’s declarations state: “That the people have a right to freedom of speech,
and of writing, and publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom of the press ought not to
be restrained.” Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, U. CHI. PRESS, http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss5.html (last visited June 12, 2022); Constitution of
Vermont - July 8, 1777, THE AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/vt01.asp (last
visited June 12, 2022). Notice that the point of the provision appears to be to protect the press, and also
note the use of the term “ought” rather than “shall” or “must.”
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the legislature, as it stated, “That the freedom of speech and debates and
proceedings in the senate and assembly shall not be impeached or questioned
in any court or place out of the senate or assembly.”65
Even if the Clause was originally thought to only apply to the
Federal Government, and even if it was thought to protect state
establishments, it is highly unlikely that the Court would turn back the clock
on incorporating the Clause, or turn back the clock on interpreting it the same
way at the state and federal level.66 Any notion that the Court would be able,
much less willing, to undo its incorporation doctrine in this area is likely
misguided.67 Whether or not the Clause should have been incorporated,
one can still ask what, if anything, the original understanding of the Clause
was vis-à-vis the Federal Government, and whether the Court got the
underlying meaning right.68 For after all, even if the Clause was partly
65
The New York Bill of Rights Statute, S. Res. 1, 1787 Leg., 10th Sess. (N.Y. 1987), (available at
https://history.nycourts.gov/nys-bill-rights-1787/).
66
Note that by the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, there were no longer any state
establishments. So, people likely had different views of the Establishment Clause than they did back when
the First Amendment was ratified.
67
With the Ramos decision, which now requires unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal cases
to align them with the federal standard under the Sixth Amendment, nearly all of the rights in the
Bill of Rights have been incorporated and each of the rights is now interpreted exactly the same vis-à-vis
the states as against the Federal Government. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 1395 (2020).
This Court has long explained, too, that incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights
bear the same content when asserted against States as they do when asserted against
the federal government. So, if the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial requires
a unanimous verdict to support a conviction in federal court, it requires no less in
state court.
Id. at 1937 (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 10–11 (1964)). The case of McDonald also poses
problems for a retreat. See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
Could the Court consistently un-incorporate the Establishment Clause without also un-incorporating the
Second Amendment? Could it somehow treat the Clause differently in the state context vs federal context
given McDonald and Ramos? See also Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 682, 689 (2019) (quoting
McDonald, 561 U. S. at 766 n.14) (unanimously incorporating the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment, even in civil in rem cases and stating “when a Bill of Rights protection is incorporated,
the protection applies ‘identically to both the Federal Government and the States.’”);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 220, 227 (1995) (holding that all racial classifications,
whether imposed by federal, state, or local authorities, must pass strict scrutiny review, and overruling
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), which held that federal affirmative action programs
would be treated more deferentially due to the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment).
Note also, that while the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not see a problem with segregated
schools, and they failed to draft an Equal Protection Clause that explicitly binds the Federal Government.
The Court reverse incorporated the Clause in the federal companion case to Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). In other words, when the
Court in Brown found that segregated schools violated the Clause, the Court also found in Bolling that
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause applied equally to the Federal Government.
Brown, 347 U.S. 483; Bolling, 347 U.S. 497. I would argue that there are stronger arguments for treating
Second Amendment and Equal Protection rights differently at the state and federal level based in the history
and prefatory language of the Second Amendment, as well as the Enforcement Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, than there are for treating the Establishment Clause differently.
68
Arguments based on enhanced federalism concerns may point to an even broader reading of
the Clause. In other words, if the Clause was designed to stop the federal government from meddling
in state establishments, then arguably the Clause would need to be read broadly enough to capture even
the most non-preferential establishments in states like New Hampshire. See DRAKEMAN, supra note 9,
at 244. New Hampshire kept its establishment until 1817. John R. Vile, Established Churches in Early
America, MIDDLE TENN. STATE UNIV.: FREE SPEECH CTR., https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/
article/801/established-churches-in-early-america (last visited June 12, 2022).
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designed to keep the Federal Government from interfering with state
establishments, by its terms, it also forbids Congress from passing laws
respecting an establishment of religion at the federal level.
ii. Anti-Catholic?
A number of scholars have criticized the judges in the Everson case,
arguing that the Everson majority and dissenting opinions were based on
anti-Catholic sentiments.69 Although the Court’s decision in the case
benefited the Catholic schools in question, the justices allegedly searched the
history to find support for their own separationist views and thus settled on
the views of Madison and Jefferson.70 Ironically, if the justices were
somehow motivated by anti-Catholic sentiments (as opposed to being
motivated by anti-state-funding-of-churches sentiments), this may have been
consistent with dominant views at the time of the Founding.71 But further,
at the time of the Founding, it was not clear that excluding Catholic
institutions from otherwise “non-preferential” government funding of the
dominant Christian sects would be seen as raising any Establishment Clause
problems (except by the Catholics and others who were excluded).72
69

See, e.g., DRAKEMAN, supra note 9, at 121–23.
See, e.g., id.
In reviewing the briefs, judicial conference notes, opinion drafts, the justices’
private correspondence and the historical sources on which the justices based their
conclusions, we can see how first Justice Rutledge and then Justice Black set off on
a premeditated search-and-employ mission to locate historical events that would be,
in [Justice] Rutledge's words, “admirable for the . . . purpose” of letting him express
his strong feelings about the case without “pointing what [he] had to say in the
direction of any specific sect,” viz., Roman Catholicism.
Drakeman, supra note 53, at 121 (footnotes omitted); see also HAMBURGER, supra note 52, at 491–92.
Drakeman’s tone and treatment of the justices are very different by the time he reaches the end of
his article, where he notes, “But in Everson, it is clear that Justice Rutledge was not doing freelance amateur
history at odds with the best published materials he could find. To the contrary, he employed an originalist
methodology that was explicitly promoted by the prominent historian whose work he consulted.”
Drakeman, supra note 53, 167. As to Justice Black, he notes:
[O]ne of Justice Black's key sources, Charles Beard, not only invokes the authority
of the framers but he also asserts that they were, in fact, committed to his vision of
the separation of church and state. In particular, he cites the “attitudes towards
religion taken by leaders among the framers of the Constitution and the plain letter
of the original document,” concluding that one of the “definite propositions” is that
“Congress [cannot] vote money for the support of all churches [nor can it] establish
one of them as a national church.”
This proposition, grounded in a
“First Amendment [that] merely confirms the intentions of the framers,” becomes
Black's “no aid” formulation, which is one of Everson's most enduring interpretive
legacies.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
71
Drakeman notes that Justice Rutlege’s biographer did not find that he harbored any anti-Catholic
bias, and that Justice Murphy’s biographer noted that Justice Rutlege was his closest friend on the Court.
DRAKEMAN, supra note 9, at 131 (citing JOHN M. FARREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF
THE COURT: THE STORY OF JUSTICE WILEY RUTLEDGE 267 (2004); SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY:
THE WASHINGTON YEARS 195 (1984)).
72
As Drakeman argues, the “maximum amount of nonpreferential reach during the Founding Era thus
embraced only Christians, and in virtually every case that meant Protestant Christians.” DRAKEMAN, supra
note 9, at 256. So-called general assessments were not for the benefit of Catholicism, Judaism, Islam,
or the religions practiced by Native American or slaves. Id. at 255–56. Catholics were not exempt from
70

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol47/iss3/6

2022]

Empty Vessel Filled with Lemon[s]

499

So, arguably, the Court was treating Catholics much better than the founding
generation. Nonetheless, some Catholics saw this as a case of winning
the battle on busing but losing the war on the Establishment Clause.73 As it
turns out, Catholics would lose the next case of McCullum v. Board of
Education.74 It is worth pointing out that Justice Murphy, the only Catholic
on the Court at the time, joined the majority in both Everson and McCullum,
which endorsed the idea of a “wall of separation.”75 Even if Justice Black had
bad motives, it is a fallacy to conclude that his decision was wrong or not
justifiable because of those sinister motivations.76 One can still be right, even
if one’s motivations are wrong.
iii. Too Narrow a Focus
Good or bad motives aside, it is fair to conclude that the Court’s overreliance on Jefferson, Madison, and the Virginia tax dispute means that the
decision is under-justified from an originalist perspective.77 Drakeman
criticizes the justices for cherry-picking the Virginia tax controversy and for
overstating the roles of Madison and particularly Jefferson.78 His argument
was that while Black cited a number of historians, those historians actually
pointed to a number of other public figures and Baptists as being more
instrumental to the movement.79 In other words, these historians do not help
make the case that “Virginia was the wellspring of a national commitment
to religious freedom or that Jefferson and Madison were the leaders of
that movement.”80 While Black relied largely on the historian Charles Beard,
Rutledge relied on the historian Irving Brant and his multi-volume biography

paying taxes to support their town’s Protestant church under New England’s general assessments, which
some have argued to the be non-preferential and thus, not “establishments.” Id. at 250–51.
73
See DRAKEMAN, supra note 9, at 106 n.136 (referencing comments by Rev. John Courtney
Murray).
74
See Illinois ex rel. McCullum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1948) (invalidating release
time for children to study religion at public school).
75
See Thomas C. Berg & William G. Ross, Some Religiously Devout Justices: Historical Notes and
Comments, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 383, 394, 396 (1998) (“The latter decision was vehemently criticized by
the Catholic hierarchy, which both worried and angered Murphy enough that he discreetly asked friends
to write some replies in his defense, and at least once wrote such a letter himself.” (footnote omitted)).
76
This is what is sometimes referred to as the genetic fallacy, for example: “The alleged mistake
of arguing that something is to be rejected because of its suspicious origins. More widely, any mistake of
inferring something about the nature of some topic from a proposition about its origins.” Genetic Fallacy,
OXFORD REFERENCE, https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095847621
(last visited June 13, 2022); see also The Oxford Companion to Philosophy—Genetic Fallacy, OXFORD
REFERENCE, https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780
199264797-e-993 (last visited June 13, 2022) (“the fallacy of confusing the causal origins of a belief with
its justification”).
77
For a recent defense of the influence of Jefferson, see John A. Ragosta, A Wall Between a Secular
Government and a Religious People, 26 ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. REV 545, 545–50 (2021).
78
DRAKEMAN, supra note 9, at 158–62.
79
For a treatment of the role of Roger Williams on the issue of disestablishment, see example,
Bogus, supra note 13, at 276-282. See generally Marci A. Hamilton, The Framers, Faith, and Tyranny,
26 ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. REV. 495 (2021) (discussing the influence of Calvinists on the Constitution).
80
Drakeman, supra note 53, at 159.
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of Madison.81 While Drakeman is somewhat critical of the justices,
in his conclusion, he seems to compliment them, as he states:
In Everson, the law office history of the establishment clause
is, in at least one respect, the real thing—that is, history as it
was being written by prominent historians in the 1940s,
an era in which the separation of church and state was
a central tenet in American liberal intellectuals’ battles
against all forms of authoritarianism, including the
Roman Catholic Church.82
Historian John A. Ragosta defends the roles of Jefferson and Madison
in a 2021 law review article.83 He argues that “not only did Jefferson and
Madison provide the intellectual and political foundation for the adoption
of the Virginia Statute for Establishing Religious Freedom, but that statute
became central to the development of the First Amendment.”84 He argues that
from the end of the eighteenth century onwards no one was consulted more
than Jefferson and Madison when people “grappled with the meaning
of religious freedom and church-state relations.”85 Thus, he argues, there was
nothing surprising or anomalous about the fact that a unanimous Supreme
Court in Reynolds v. United States “found that Jefferson’s and Madison’s
views . . . ‘defined’ American religious freedom and the meaning of the
First Amendment.”86 As noted above, Everson’s unanimous adoption
of Jefferson’s metaphor was rooted in Reynolds.87 There can be no question
that Jefferson and Madison were important and influential Founding Fathers,
and they, like a few others, had strong views on the separation of church and
state.88 They are, no doubt, an important part of the historical picture, but they
are not the whole picture.89 In the words of Kent Greenawalt, “the views of
Jefferson and Madison failed to represent the broad range of positions that
81

Id. at 167.
Id. at 168.
See Ragosta, supra note 77, at 547–49. Ragosta notes that much of the critique of the influence
of Jefferson began at the invitation of Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Wallace. Id.; see also
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98–99 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
84
Ragosta, supra note 77, at 547–48.
85
Id. at 548.
86
Id. at 548–49 (footnote omitted). And again, it was the Virginia Statute, Jefferson’s letter to
the Danbury Baptists, and Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments that
were so central. Id.
87
Id. at 545, 548–49.
88
See generally id.
89
As the historian John Reid stated,
[T]o acknowledge that the doctrine rests on irrelevant history need not make it bad
law. Just as decisions holding that “[t]he First Amendment has erected a wall
between church and state” have become judicial precedents binding on lower courts,
so has Jefferson's quotation been repeated so often it has assumed autonomous status
as an example of forensic history. If it is not historically relevant as proof of the
original meaning of the First Amendment, it enjoys a somewhat greater forensic
legitimacy than some of the “history” currently being marshalled against it.
Reid, supra note 51, at 221 (footnotes omitted).
82
83
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would have been aspects of an original understanding . . . .”90 Given that
seven states at the time of the Founding provided aid to religion and even
more restricted office-holding to Christians, it is doubtful that all of those who
voted to approve the Clause either in Congress or in the state conventions
shared Jefferson and Madison’s strict separationist view.91
V.

CAN MORE CERTAINTY BE FOUND IN THE DEBATES
IN CONGRESS?

While many scholars have scoured the historical record, they have
not arrived at a consensus but rather numerous conflicting views regarding
the meaning of the text and the views of the Founders and Framers
of the text.92 The search for a definitive and coherent view of the Clause in
the thoughts, papers, and constitutional debates of our Founding Fathers is
most likely a fool’s errand or something of a wild goose chase.93 One most
likely needs to cherry-pick to arrive at a coherent view, as our Founders’
views on the Clause were likely as varied as their religious beliefs.94
90
Kent Greenawalt, Some Reflections on Fundamental Questions about the Original Understanding
of the Establishment Clause, in NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION: AMERICA’S ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION
TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 341, 351–52 (T. Jeremy Gunn & John Witte, Jr. eds., 2012). Note that Drakeman
concludes that the historians relied on by Justice Black and Justice Rutledge were “producing highly
respected, mainstream history, as history tended to be practiced in the era in which they were writing.”
DRAKEMAN, supra, note 9, at 147–48.
91
See DRAKEMAN, supra note 9, at 250 (discussing ecclesiastical taxes in Virginia, South Carolina,
Georgia, and New England states). Eleven of the thirteen states at the time of the founding restricted office
holding to Christians, and most, not only excluded Muslims and Jews but also Catholics. Id. at 253 (citing
THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 221 (1986)).
92
See generally DRAKEMAN, supra note 9.
93
See, e.g., Dreisbach, supra note 9, at 252 (“They may have deliberately settled on language vague
in meaning and subject to multiple interpretations and, thus, acceptable to diverse constituencie. . . .
Therefore, the search for a fixed, discernible original understanding of the First Amendment may be
an impossible undertaking.”). Drakeman’s review and evaluation of the scholarly literature in light of the
historical record (over 100 pages) led him to conclude that very little could be said regarding the meaning
of the clause at the time. DRAKEMAN, supra note 9, at 228. Based on his research, there simply was
no “common usage” of the term “establishment” at the time of the founding and further, “there was no
reason that people needed to have a common understanding of the word ‘establishment’ to vote for (or
against) the First Amendment, and the best description of all the available evidence is that they did not.”
Id. Thoughtful people disagreed on its meaning and he sees no reason to force the different uses of the
term into a convenient common usage. Id. As he concludes the chapter, “the establishment clause
represented, at most, broad, noncontroversial language on which a majority of the First Congress (and the
ratifiers) could agree . . . .” Id. at 262.
94
ALF J. MAPP, JR., THE FAITHS OF FATHERS: WHAT AMERICA’S FOUNDERS REALLY BELIEVED 2
(2003). That is, if they had much of a view on it at all. DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH-STATE,
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 71 (1991). Note that there was no enumerated power for the federal government
to establish a church. See U.S. CONST. art. I. Drakeman, in his earlier work, held the view that the
Founding Era had a “lack of interest amounting virtually to apathy towards the establishment clause.”
DRAKEMAN, supra, at 71. Alf J. Mapp, Jr. notes that the religious attitudes of the Founding Fathers
“were as varied as their political opinions.” MAPP, supra, at 2. While many of the Founding Fathers were
part of mainstream religious congregations, many were not. Gregg Frazer, The Faith of the Founding
Fathers, MASTER’S UNIV. (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.masters.edu/news/the-faith-of-the-foundingfathers.html. For example, while Washington was an Anglican, a Freemason, and did the Thanksgiving
prayer, he also concluded a treaty with Tripoli that stated that “the government of the United States
of America is not in any sense founded on the Christian religion . . . .” Treaty of Peace and Friendship
between the United States of America and the Bey and Subjects of Tripoli of Barbary, art. 11, U.S.-Tripoli,
Nov. 3, 1796, 8 Stat. 154. Jefferson refused to do the Thanksgiving prayer because he thought it
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With that said, it is hard to know if catching the goose is impossible
unless one tries. So, let us see if we can discover the original meaning of
the Clause. One method for arriving at the original meaning of the text is to
look to the original intent of the Framers; to do this one may look at the
legislative history and debates in Congress concerning the text.
Marion Tinling, in defense of his work on the subject, conjured the authority
of William Blackstone, as he stated, “The fairest and most rational method
to interpret the will of the legislator . . . is to explore his intentions at the time
when the law was made.”95 Unfortunately, as Tinling demonstrates
in his work, this is truly one of those areas where one can look out over
the crowded cocktail party in search of one’s friends.96
The truth of the matter is that the party was filled with friends and
foes and those who did not appear to care all that much about the Clause.97
To mix our metaphors, these geese are not all flying in the same direction,
and most of them don’t seem to care very much where they are going.

was unconstitutional. Erin Blakemore, Thomas Jefferson’s Complicated Relationship with Thanksgiving,
HISTORY, https://www.history.com/news/thomas-jeffersons-complicated-relationship-with-thanksgiving
(Nov. 18, 2019). Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin were deists, John Adams was Unitarian.
See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, Is this a Christian Nation?: An Introduction, 26 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
237, 257 (2021) (“Two, Franklin and Jefferson, expressly disavowed belief in the divinity of Jesus,
and therefore cannot be classified as Christian. Adams may not be quite as clear but should probably also
be classified as a non-Christian. Alexander Hamilton expressly said he believed in the divinity of Christ
and therefore must be classified as Christian. The remaining two, George Washington and James Madison,
cannot be definitively classified one way or the other.”).
95
Marion Tinling, Thomas Lloyd's Reports of the First Federal Congress, 18 WM & MARY Q. 519,
519–20 (1961). Unfortunately, this statement was taken out of context, for Blackstone never suggested
that one look to legislative debates to understand the will of the legislature. The full quote from section 2
of his COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND is as follows:
The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is by
exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs the most natural
and probable. And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter,
the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law. Let us take a short
view of them all.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 59 (William Carey Jones ed., 1916)
96
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). In Conroy v, Aniskoff,
Justice Scalia described the use of legislative history using the analogy coined by Justice Leventhal, that
it the “equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one's
friends.” Id. Justice Scalia famously criticized the approach, both here and in his other works, as being
illegitimate. As he further stated in Conroy:
The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are governed by
laws, not by the intentions of legislators. As the Court said in 1844: “The law as
it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that
will is spoken is in the act itself . . . .” But not the least of the defects of legislative
history is its indeterminacy. If one were to search for an interpretive technique that,
on the whole, was more likely to confuse than to clarify, one could hardly find
a more promising candidate than legislative history.
Id. (quoting Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9, 24 (1844)). Notably, he also draws attention to the wasteful
consequences of such an approach, even though, he argues elsewhere that consequentialist arguments are
not appropriate for interpreting the Constitution. Id.
97
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 79
(1986).
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Worse yet, we have very limited access to what took place at the party, and
what we have is not very reliable.98
Take, for instance, James Madison’s proposal. His proposed draft
read: “The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief
or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full
and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext
infringed.”99 With regards to the establishment question, Madison’s proposal
was not as broad as the final text, for it only forbade the establishment
of a national religion, not laws respecting an establishment.100 Although
we know what Madison brought to the party, we don’t know for certain why
his proposed amendment was rejected. His proposal went to both the House
and the Senate.101 While we have some clues as to what took place in
the House, the Senate debates took place behind closed doors in secret,
and there was no record taken of the debates.102 Summaries of the House
debates were written, but Madison himself complained that the notes gave
“some idea of the discussion” but that they showed “the strongest evidences
of mutilation & perversion, and of the illiteracy of the Editor.”103
According to the Annals of Congress, the debate in the House that
day began with a consideration of Article I, Section 9.104 With the insertion
of “no religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights
of conscience be infringed.”105 Only nine members of the House were
reported as engaging in the debate on that day.106 I will address them in the
order they were reported. Mr. Sylvester feared that the proposed language
might have the “tendency to abolish religion altogether.”107 Mr. Vining made
the unintelligible suggestion that the “two members of the sentence”

See, e.g., id. (“The debate was sometimes irrelevant, usually apathetic and unclear.”).
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (1789) (J. Gales ed., 1834) (James Madison’s Resolution for Amendments
to the Constitution on June 8, 1789). Natelson argues that this was an attempt to embody what he termed
the “public bargain” or the “Gentleman’s Agreement” that would allow for the Constitution’s ratification.
Natelson, supra note 51, at 136.
100
U.S. CONST. art. I.
101
Stephanie H. Barclay et al., The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause: A Corpus
Linguistics Analysis. 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 505, 513 (2019).
102
See Tinling, supra note 95, at 520 (“The Senate sat with closed doors; aside from letters,
memoranda, and journals of members, we have no record of its debates in the first Congress.”).
103
Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (James Madison)). As Tinling notes, these criticisms applied
to all reporters of the First Congress. Id. Questions regarding the accuracy of the various reporters and
newspaper reports were often discussed in the House, and at one point a resolution was put forth to
the effect that “the publishers of the debates in the Congressional Register and the New York newspapers
had misrepresented them so flagrantly that the House should no longer give sanction to such reporting.”
Id. (citing Lloyd, Cong. Reg., II, 442–43). Interestingly, Tinling notes that while Lloyd reported that
specific blunders and misconceptions were pointed out in the debate, he also reported not taking down
those specifics. Id.
104
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 757 (1789) (J. Gales ed., 1834).
105
Id.
106
Id. at 757–59.
107
Id. at 757. His full statement as reported was, “Mr. Vining suggested the propriety of transposing
the two members of the sentence.” Id.
98
99
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be “transpos[ed].”108 Mr. Sherman thought the provision was unnecessary
since Congress was given no power “to make religious establishments . . . .”109
Mr. Carroll supported the provision noting that “the rights of conscience are,
in their nature, of [a] peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch
of governmental hand . . . .”110 He also noted that “many sects” did not believe
that they were “well secured” under the Constitution as it stood prior to
amendment.111 Responding to Mr. Sherman, Mr. Madison noted that some of
the state Conventions feared that the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article
I might give the Federal Government the power to enact such laws.112
He interpreted the Religion Clauses to mean that “Congress should not
establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel
men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience.”113
Mr. Huntington agreed with the fears of Mr. Sylvester above.114 He further
noted that ministers and their “meeting-houses” were supported through
contributions under by-laws, and as such, “[i]f an action was brought before
a Federal Court on any of these cases, the person who neglected to perform
his engagements could not be compelled to do it; for a support of ministers,
or building of places of worship might be construed into a
religious establishment.”115 He poked fun at the effects of Rhode Island’s
Establishment Clause, and thus, while he supported the freedom of conscience
provision, he did not support the establishment provision.116 Mr. Madison
then came back and proposed that the word “national” be inserted
before religion.117 In support of the view, he stated that “[h]e believed that
the people feared one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine
together, and establish a religion to which they would compel others
to conform.”118 The insertion of the word “national” would point the
Amendment in this direction and, by implication, away from the interpretation
and concern of Mr. Huntington that the Clause could extend to state
establishments.119 But Mr. Livermore objected and proposed a more generous
textual amendment which is arguably closer to the language of the
final Amendment, namely, the “Congress shall make no laws touching
religion, or infringing the rights of conscience.”120 Mr. Gerry also opposed
inserting the term “national,” for it implied that there was a “national”

108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 757–58.
Id. at 758.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. He also did not want to patronize those who professed no religion at all. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 758–59.
Id. at 759. He also noted that he did not want to dwell on the subject. Id.
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government and not a “federal” government.121 Oddly, Mr. Madison
reportedly withdrew his proposal and then made the point that the insertion
of the word “national” before “religion” did not imply that there was
a national government.122 They then voted on Mr. Livermore’s motion,
which passed thirty-one to twenty.123 The Amendment came up again with
the other amendments on August 20, 1789.124 Without any arguments
provided for the change, Mr. Ames proposed that the text now read,
“Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free
exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience.”125 No debate on
the alteration was recorded.126 The record simply states that it was adopted
and agreed to.127
What might be drawn from this? We do not know why the majority
voted in favor of Livermore’s language, given the absence of any stated views
on the exact language and the fact that less than one-fourth of the
representatives spoke on the subject at all. One might presume that
the insertion of the word “Congress” accomplished the same goal as inserting
the term “national” without the accompanying drawbacks. We know even
less about why everyone changed their minds and voted for the amended
establishment language, which changed “Congress shall make no laws
touching religion” to “Congress shall make no law establishing
religion . . . .”128 The record does not give one much confidence that
a majority of the House cared about the difference.129 This does support the
view that the main concern was to prevent overreach by the
Federal Government, but it is inconclusive as to whether the majority really
preferred the more limited language of prohibiting laws that established
religion over the broader and more restrictive language of congressional laws
touching on religion.
The version in the Senate went through several changes, but as noted
above, no debate was recorded.130 The version that came out of the Senate
121

Id.
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 795.
125
Id. at 796.
126
Id. One might note that a typical law faculty meeting and vote on most any topic of importance or
controversy generally elicits more participation and considerably more passionate discussion than
is evidenced in the House debate on the Religion Clauses.
127
Id. The next paragraph took up an amendment which would exempt conscientious objectors from
the requirement that they take up arms. Id. at 796. Interestingly, Mr. Scott objected to the clause,
not because he wanted to deprive scrupulous sects of the exemption, but because he did not want those
who are of no religion to get the exemption. Id. He noted the observation that “religion is on the decline
[and] if so, the argument is more strong in my favor, for when the time comes that religion shall be
discarded, the generality of persons will have recourse to these pretexts to get excused from bearing arms.”
Id. Mr. Boudinot argued strongly in favor of the exemption. Id. The reporter then notes that
“[s]ome further desultory conversation arose . . . .” Id.
128
Id. at 759, 796.
129
Id. at 796.
130
See also Tinling, supra note 95, at 520.
122
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read: “Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode
of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging the
freedom of speech, or the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the Government for the redress of grievances.”131
But before getting here, the Senate rejected three drafts that explicitly only
banned the preference of one religious sect over the other.132
In the end, the conference committee of the two houses returned the
final version, which replaced the limited language with the broader language
we now have, namely, “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion.”133 Douglas Laycock points out that:
The establishment clause actually adopted is one of the
broadest versions considered by either House. It forbids not
only establishments, but also any law respecting or relating
to an establishment. Most important, it forbids any law
respecting an establishment of “religion.” It does not say
“a religion,” “a national religion,” “one sect or society,”
or “any particular denomination of religion.” It is religion
generically that may not be established.”134
It is fairly well-settled that the state debates leading to ratification
were “scanty” and not very enlightening.135 It is commonly accepted that
the states were mainly concerned with federal overreach, and so they most
likely preferred the broader, and thus the more restrictive, language of the
final draft than the previous House or Senate drafts. From the beginning,
Anti-Federalists were concerned that a national/federal established religion
would undermine the freedom of conscience.136

131
The Two Religion Clauses, TEACHING AM. HIST., https://teachingamericanhistory.org/resource/
themes/religion-clauses/ (last visited June 13, 2022).
132
Douglas Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent,
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 879–81 (1986). Laycock argues that since the Senate rejected a version
that would have allowed non-preferential aid to religion, then non-preferential aid must be forbidden by
the clause. Id.
133
U.S. CONST. amend. I. (emphasis added).
134
Id. at 881.
135
Natelson, supra note 51, at 77 (“The records of state ratification of the Bill of Rights are scanty.”).
136
Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346,
398–404 (2002). Feldman argues that
[w]hen ‘establishment’ was prohibited, the Framers meant at least that such
preferential arrangements violated liberty of conscience and were therefore
unacceptable. Whether nonpreferential systems that purported to allow exemptions
for dissenters violated liberty of conscience was a subject of debate; even if we
assume that Congress did not intend to bar such systems at the federal level
(the answer seems shrouded in uncertainty), we still know that the Framers agreed
on the principle of liberty of conscience.
Id. at 405.
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IS THERE MORE TO BE FOUND ELSEWHERE IN THE HISTORICAL
RECORD?

Robert Natelson concedes that the debate over the Bill of Rights in
the First Congress appears inconclusive.137 But for him, this is only when it
is not read in the right context.138 According to Natelson, the too oft reliance
on the views of Jefferson and Madison and their arguments made during the
Virginia disestablishment battle are not the right place to look.139
For Natelson, the right place to look is in the deal that Federalists had to make
with moderate Anti-Federalists to get the Constitution ratified.140 Rather than
look to the few actors that debated the Amendment in the House and the views
of prominent Founding Fathers on the subject like Jefferson and Madison, the
answer is said to lie in the articles, pamphlets, and partial transcripts of the
ratifying conventions written by hundreds of actors.141
Natelson argues that “if the meaning of a writing (here, the
Establishment Clause) is uncertain, one way to resolve the uncertainty may
be to examine the transactions that produced the writing.”142 According to
Natelson, the First Amendment was written because of the demands of
political reality, which meant that in order to get the Constitution ratified,
Federalists had to agree with Anti-Federalists to make the Amendments.143
There is, however, something of a disconnect between the “deal” made,
which he refers to as the “Gentleman’s Agreement,” and his conclusions
regarding the Establishment Clause.144 His enumeration of the Agreement
does not mention religion or establishment issues at all.145 Natelson details
three principle kinds of concessions made in the Agreement, namely:
(1) providing authoritative interpretations of worrisome parts of
the unamended Constitution (none having anything to do with religion);
(2) reassurances that states would retain wide and exclusive jurisdiction over
certain matters (again no mention of religion); and if these were not sufficient,

137
Natelson, supra note 51, at 77. “[S]everal have pronounced the historical record hopelessly
confused.” Id. at 76–77 (citing JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1411
(7th ed. 2004)). In their 8th edition, the authors note that “[t]here is a seemingly irresistible impulse
to appeal to history when analyzing issues under the religion clauses. This tendency is unfortunate because
there is no clear history as to the meaning of the clauses.” JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1548 (8th ed. 2010).
138
Natelson, supra note 51, at 77.
139
Id. at 77–78.
140
Id. at 79.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 80 (footnote omitted). He goes on to point out that “[y]et in the case of the
Gentlemen's Agreement leading to the Establishment Clause, commentators have tended not to do so.” Id.
143
Id. at 79.
144
Id. at 79–80.
145
Id. at 82–83. Natelson details three principal kinds of concessions, namely: (1) providing
authoritative interpretations of worrisome parts of the unamended Constitution (none having anything to
do with religion); (2) reassurances that states would retain wide and exclusive jurisdiction over certain
matters (again no mention of religion); and (3) if the terms they agreed to were not sufficient, the
Constitution could be amended after ratification. Id.
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(3) that there would be amendments after the Constitution was ratified.146
Natelson then describes Madison’s proposed amendments as fulfilling that
bargain.147
Thus, Natelson views Madison’s proposed Amendment that
“[t]he civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief
or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full
and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext infringed”
as merely fulfilling this Agreement.148 He quotes a letter from Senator Butler
to James Iredell, which states:
A few milk-and-water amendments have been proposed by
Mr. M[adison]., such as liberty of conscience, a free press,
and one or two general things already well secured. I suppose
it was done to keep his promise with his constituents, to move
for alterations; but, if I am not greatly mistaken, he is not
hearty in the cause of amendments.149
He also quotes a letter from Tench Coxe to Madison applauding
his proposed amendments as being pleasing to “the most ardent [and] irritable
among our friends” and as not arousing any “unfavorable animadversion”
from the opposition.150
This does not inspire much confidence regarding the considered
judgments of the Framers or their constituents with regards to the
Establishment Clause’s meaning. The “Agreement” itself was exceptionally
vague regarding the religion clauses. It was, at best, an empty vessel.
If Madison’s proposal satisfied the Agreement, then presumably, the
opposition/Anti-Federalists would have been okay with a provision that
protected freedom of conscience in addition to the free exercise of religion.
Freedom of conscience goes beyond the free exercise of religion and would
146
See id. at 82–83 (mentioning the Ex Post Facto Clause and the General Welfare Clause,
the regulation of real estate within state boundaries, governance of agriculture and manufacturing,
adjudication of matters between citizens of the same state, and care of the poor).
147
Id. at 85–86. Natelson excepts Madison’s recommendation to limit state infringements on
individual liberties because, according to Natelson, there was no public support for the view. Id. at 85.
He does not, however, except Madison's proposed religion amendment. Id. at 85–86.
148
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (1789) (J. Gales ed., 1834) (James Madison’s Resolution for Amendments
to the Constitution on June 8, 1789.
149
Natelson, supra note 51, at 85 n.67 (quoting Letter from Pierce Butler to James Iredell
(Aug. 11, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS 274 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS)).
150
Id. at 86 n.73. As he stated:
In short the most ardent & irritable among our friends are well pleased with them. On the part of the
opposition, I do not observe any unfavorable animadversion. Those who are honest are well pleased at
the footing on which the press, liberty of conscience, original right & power, trial by jury &ca. are rested.
. . . I feel very great satisfaction in being able to assure you generally that the proposed amendments will
greatly tend to promote harmony among the late contending parties and a general confidence in
the patriotism of Congress.
Id. (quoting Letter from Tench Coxe to James Madison (June 18, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 149, at 252).
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include the right to not believe. If Madison’s attempted amendment was seen
as fulfilling the bargain, then it is difficult to see how Natelson concludes:
We have seen that by the terms of the Gentlemen’s
Agreement, the policy against establishment was designed to
further the policy of free exercise, and that free exercise
extended to all theists, but only to theists. We have seen
further that government service was to be open to all theists,
but only to theists. It is logical to deduce, therefore, that
the Establishment Clause was designed to protect all theists,
but only theists, and that the Clause permitted government to
support all faiths on a non-preferential basis. This deduction
is supported by a plethora of historical evidence.151
But further, Natelson gets here in the same way that many who search
the historical record do. They fill up the vessel, here the Gentleman’s
Agreement, with what they perceive to be helpful in the historical record. 152
But finding a few people who make somewhat vague comments respecting
the Free Exercise Clause, or freedom of conscience, is not a solid foundation
for claims as to the meaning of the Establishment Clause.153 Natelson relies
almost exclusively on the views of Oliver Ellsworth and John Locke for
the proposition that the Founders’ views on the Free Exercise Clause included
freedom of conscience for theists but not for atheists.154 While Ellsworth was
an important Founding Father, and the views of John Locke were very
influential on some of the Founding Fathers, Locke’s comments regarding
toleration were not directly on point. If historians question the relevance of
Jefferson’s views regarding the original meaning of the Establishment Clause,
then Locke is at least once more removed.155 Locke—who was not
an American, much less a Founding Father—is quoted as saying:
Lastly, those are not at all to be tolerated who deny
the being of a God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which
151
Id. at 112. This echoes the views of Justice Scalia, who stated, “the Establishment Clause . . .
permits the disregard of devout atheists.” McCreary Cnty. v. Am. C.L. Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 893
(2005) (Scalia, J. with Rehnquist, CJ. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
152
For example, Natelson focuses almost exclusively on the views of Ellsworth on Free Exercise
and his view that government could punish Atheists. Natelson, supra note 51, at 97–101 (citing
14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 150, 450, 482–83
(Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1976)).
153
Ellsworth is quoted as saying:
But while I assert the right of religious liberty; I would not deny that the civil power
has a right, in some cases, to interfere in matters of religion. It has a right to prohibit
and punish gross immoralities and impieties; because the open practice of these is of
evil example and public detriment. For this reason, I heartily approve of our laws
against drunkenness, profane swearing, blasphemy, and professed atheism.
Id. at 99 (quoting 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 152, at 451)
154
Id. at 97–101.
155
See Reid, supra note 51, at 220–21 (noting Jefferson’s “relevance” in relation to the separation
of church and state).
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are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon
an atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in
thought, dissolves all; besides also, those that by their
atheism undermine and destroy all religion, can have no
pretence [sic] of religion whereupon to challenge the
privilege of a toleration.156
Unfortunately, Natelson fails to note or realize that Locke also did not extend
toleration to Catholics. As Locke stated:
Since men usually take up their religion in gross,
and assume to themselves the opinions of their party all
at once in a bundle, it often happens, that they mix with their
religious worship, and speculative opinions, other doctrines
absolutely destructive to the society wherein they live, as
is evident in the Roman Catholics that are subjects of any
prince but the pope. These therefore blending such opinions
with their religion, reverencing them as fundamental truths,
and submitting to them as articles of their faith, ought not
to be tolerated by the magistrate in the exercise of their
religion unless he can be secured, that he can allow one part,
without the spreading of the other, and that the propagation
of these dangerous opinions may be separated from their
religious worship, which I suppose is very hard to be done.157
Thus, if the Framers’ views of the religion clauses track the views of Locke,
then free exercise did not extend to all theists but only to Protestant Christians,
and by his logic, the Establishment Clause also did not run to all theists,
not even to all Christians.
That still leaves the views of Ellsworth, but as noted, those views
conflict with those of Jefferson and Madison.158 Further, as Douglas Laycock
reminds us, both Maryland and Virginia rejected providing non-preferential
financial aid, and although some states in New England provided financial aid
to more than one Christian sect, these were “preferential in practice and
156
Natelson, supra note 51, at 101 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Charles L. Sherman ed., 1965) (1689)).
157
JOHN LOCKE, An Essay Concerning Toleration, in JOHN LOCKE: A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 105, 117–18 (Mark Goldie ed., 2010) (1667) (footnote omitted);
see also J.C. Walmsley & Felix Waldman, John Locke and the Toleration of Catholics: A New Manuscript,
62 HIST. J. 1093, 1094 (2019) (“Locke’s position would evolve to tolerate every religious sect on the basis
of their speculative beliefs and worship, but consistently except Catholics for their seditious articles of
faith: the pope’s power to dissolve oaths, to legislate infallibly, and to depose foreign rulers
as excommunicates or heretics. The manuscript below reveals that Locke reached this position only after
he had addressed a number of arguments in favour of Catholic toleration.”); JEFFREY R. COLLINS, IN
THE SHADOW OF LEVIATHAN: JOHN LOCKE AND THE POLITICS OF CONSCIENCE 271–314 (David Armitage
et al. eds., 2020) (refuting claims that Locke softened his position on the intolerability of Catholics by
appealing to a ‘loyalist’, oath-taking minority tradition and demonstrating Locke’s lifelong refusal to
countenance such Gallican—or, in the English context, ‘Blackloist’—solutions to the Catholic question).
158
See supra notes 147–53 and accompanying text.
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were the source of bitter religious strife.”159 If this is coupled with the Senate
drafting history, which rejected three explicitly non-preferential drafts of the
Clause, then Natelson’s conclusions are woefully under-supported.
Drakeman, in Church, State, and Original Intent, concludes
his search for the historical high ground as to the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause, with the view that it does not provide “any recipe for
the future of church-state relations.”160 Based on his research, there simply
was no “common usage” of the term “establishment” at the time of
the Founding.161 In essence, this means they left us with a relatively empty
vessel.162 But why would they do that? Why leave something so important
so unsettled? As Drakeman argues, they did not need to agree on what the
text meant, “there was no reason that people needed to have a common
understanding of the word ‘establishment’ to vote for (or against) the
First Amendment, and the best description of all the available evidence is that
they did not.”163 His review of the debates in the ratifying conventions and
the First Congress only establishes that a few people expressed concern that
Congress might create a national religion.164 The Clause clearly succeeds in
prohibiting this, but as he argues, “there is no body of evidence that supports
any more detailed sense of what the language meant to the people who voted
for it or to the American public who received it.”165
Thus, Drakeman finds that there is no “originalist” support for
a number of more detailed views of the Establishment Clause: whether it be
the view that non-preferential economic support of religion was acceptable
while preferential support was not, the view that the Establishment Clause
embodies a non-coercion consensus, or even the view that the Establishment
Clause was meant to prohibit the Federal Government from interfering with
state establishments.166

159

Laycock, supra note 132, at 878.
DRAKEMAN, supra note 9, at 262.
161
Id. at 228.
162
To be clear, Drakeman does not argue that the vessel is completely empty or that the historical
search ends with indeterminacy. Id. at 342–43. Rather, he argues that the historical record supports
the limited view that the Clause was meant to forbid the establishment of a national religion. Id. at 342.
Drakeman confesses that in his earlier work, he took the view that the original intentions were
“unknowable.” Id. at 343 n.24. As he stated in earlier work,
In fact, all of these suggestions about how to interpret the establishment clause based
on the framers' intentions are just short of complete speculation because they are
based solely on the extremely sparse and highly questionable historical records.
The records simply contain too little evidence. To the extent that we can broadly
read the sense of the secondhand historical documents, they most clearly show a lack
of interest amounting virtually to apathy towards the establishment clause.
DRAKEMAN, supra note 94, at 71.
163
DRAKEMAN, supra note 9, at 228.
164
Id. at 262.
165
Id. at 260.
166
Id. at 229–58, 261 (discussing non-preferentialism at 249-58, anti-coercion at 261 n.197,
and enhanced-federalism at 229-49).
160
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Drakeman debunks the idea that non-preferential financial support
of religion was somehow acceptable while preferential support of religion
was thought to be improper. Catholics were often not thought of or treated
as “Christians,” and eleven of the thirteen original states limited office holders
to “Christians.”167 As Drakemen argues:
[G]eneral assessments in effect at the time of the Bill of
Rights were intentionally and explicitly for the benefit
of Protestants, . . . in most cases, they existed primarily for
the benefit of the demographically dominant denomination.
Whether genuinely non-preferential financial support for
religion in general would have constituted an establishment
in the minds of Americans in the Founding Era is
an interesting but entirely hypothetical question since it
would have been unthinkable politically, socially, and
religiously to provide tax support for Roman Catholicism in
New England or for Judaism or Islam anywhere in the new
nation, let alone government funding for all of the forms of
religiosity found in the country at the time, including
Native American religions, slave religions, witchcraft,
Shakerism, and other manifestations of non-mainstream
religiosity.168
Thus, Natelson’s argument that the founding generation came to adopt a nonpreferentialist view of the Establishment Clause is true if what we mean by
non-preferentialism is that one can prefer Protestants to Catholics, Jews,
Native Americans, slaves, Shakers, and those who practiced witchcraft. His
view that people thought of it as protecting theists, but not atheists
and agnostics, is again supported if, by-in-large, Catholics, Jews, and other
non-Protestants are not viewed as theists.169 From the perspective of
the Protestant majority, preferences for Protestants or “Christians” in general
would not offend the Establishment Clause.170 Did the Catholics, Jews, etc.,
167

Id. at 253.
Id. at 255–56. For the view that in the six states that provided state subsidies for multiple religious
organization were non-preferential, see LEONARD W. LEVY, JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 201–02 (1972).
Note that Levy describes these practices as
“multiple establishments.” Id. In other words, his work does not support the view that these
non-preferential subsidies were not considered establishments at the time of the founding, rather the
practice of state aid of religion, even if non-preferential, was considered an establishment practice at
the time of the founding.
169
Natelson, supra note 51, at 138. Drakeman notes that many ministers viewed Catholics as having
succumbed to the prince of darkness. DRAKEMAN, supra note 9, at 251 (citing CHARLES P. HANSON,
NECESSARY VIRTUE: THE PRAGMATIC ORIGINS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN NEW ENGLAND 9 (1998)).
170
Id. at 256. There is some dispute as to whether a majority of people during the Founding Era were
actually practicing religion. See id. at 253–54 (citing Jon Butler, Why Revolutionary America Wasn’t
a ‘Christian Nation,’ in RELIGION AND THE NEW REPUBLIC 187, 191 (James H. Hutson eds., 1999) (arguing
that less than 20% were practicing); Patricia U. Bonami & Peter R. Eisenstadt, Church Adherence in the
Eighteenth Century British American Colonies, 39 WM & MARY Q. 246, 246–86 (1982) (arguing that 80%
were church adherents)).
168
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as well as atheists and agnostics, see it the same way? We know that Baptists
opposed the government’s support of religion.171 While some Catholics
supported non-preferentialism in theory, other prominent Catholics supported
a strict separationist view of the Clause.172 If this is where originalism takes
us, then it must be rejected as a guide to current and future church-state
doctrine. Surely no member of the Catholic-dominated Supreme Court would
endorse what appears to be the dominant “original” understanding, namely,
that Catholics were not really Christians and that they, along with Jews,
Muslims, and other theists, could be discriminated against when it comes
to federal funding.
Drakeman also finds no support for the “anti-coercion” view of the
Establishment Clause in the historical record.173 He criticizes the view of
Noah Feldman, who writes, “By the time of the American Revolution,
it would have been difficult to find any American who disagreed with the
proposition that every person was entitled to liberty of conscience and that no
government could legitimately coerce people in matters of religion.”174
Drakeman argues that this could only be true if “‘people’ means solely
Caucasian Protestants.”175 Interestingly, Drakeman reports that a study

171
See, e.g., Charles McDaniel, The Decline of the Separation Principle in the Baptist Tradition of
Religious Liberty, 50 J. CHURCH & ST. 413, 416–17 (2008) (stating that Baptists were known for their
consistent strict separationist views, be it in the views of Roger Williams, John Leland, or Isaac Backus).
Remember, Jefferson’s famous phrase “wall of separation between Church & State” was in an 1802 letter
in response to a letter he received from the Danbury Baptists who were both congratulating him on his
election victory and relaying their concerns over their own persecution. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
the Comm. Danbury Baptists Ass’n (Jan. 1, 1802) (on file at https://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/
danpre.html) (“I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which
declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between Church & State.”). For the view that
Baptists were not seeking formal separation of church and state but merely sought to maintain
the distinction between civil and spiritual office, see HAMBURGER, supra note 52, at 35.
172
Carey, supra note 52, at 337–38. As Carey writes, “Some, like the Maryland Carrolls, saw in
the non-establishment clause a restriction upon the government's preferential support for one religion.
Others, like John England, saw in it an almost total restriction upon the government's support for any
religion.” Id. at 337. As he further notes, “Although [the Carrolls] accepted Maryland's constitutional
preference for Christianity, they did not consider this an attempt to establish religion. It did not seem
to bother them that the constitution restricted the civil rights of Jews.” Id. (footnote omitted). Note that in
Carroll’s writing he indicates that
Catholic citizens joined together with Presbyterians, Methodists, Quakers, and
Baptists to oppose a minister's salary bill that would have activated the legislature's
discretionary power [to provide non-preferential support for religion]. They were
unwilling in this case even to accept a non-preferential approach to state aid to
religion because they believed the bill would in fact give the Protestant Episcopal
church a “predominant and irresistible influence.”
Id. at 338 (quoting Letter from John Carroll to Charles Plowden (Feb. 27, 1785)). As he tells us, Bishop
John England “printed the First Amendment on the masthead of his diocesan newspaper, the United States
Catholic Miscellany, and generally understood it to put severe restrictions upon governmental aid to any
and all religions.” Id. at 339.
173
DRAKEMAN, supra note 9, at 261.
174
Id. at 261 n.197 (quoting NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE
PROBLEM AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 42 (2005)).
175
Id.
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of indictments in Virginia between 1720 and 1750, revealed that missing
church was one of the most commonly indicted offenses.176
As Drakeman concludes, “the establishment clause does not
reflect . . . ‘broad substantive values upon which a majority of early
Americans could agree.’”177 More specifically, unlike Green, who “asserts
that the drafters and ratifiers had ‘common, broad ideals that found their way
into the language of the First Amendment: freedom of conscience,
no compelled support of religion; no delegation of government authority to
religious institutions; and equal treatment of all sects,’” Drakeman finds no
evidence in the historical record to support this view.178 The problem,
according to Drakeman, is that these do not represent shared values at the time
of the drafting, given the practice of compelling Catholics to support
Protestant churches in Massachusetts and laws that banned Jewish people
from holding office in many states.179 Further, he argues that there simply
is no evidence that the drafters or ratifiers were attempting to “imbue the
constitutional language with any of these values . . . .”180 After three hundred
and forty-five pages of careful argument, Drakeman can only find support in
the historical record for the view that the Clause was designed to prohibit
a national religion.181
VII.

ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING AND THE PROMISE OF
META-DATA?

Again, this leaves our vessel relatively empty. But what if we try
a different approach? What if we adopt a “new originalist” approach,
as advocated by the late Justice Scalia and numerous contemporary
academics, and try to identify the original public meaning of the Clause?182
176
Id. at 254 (citing Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding,
Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2145 (2003)) (the most common in
eleven of twenty-two counties and the second most common in seven others).
177
Id. at 260-61 (quoting Steven K. Green, Federalism and the Establishment Clause:
A Reassessment, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 761, 761, 767 (2005)).
178
Id. at 261 (quoting Green, supra note 177, at 761, 767).
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
See generally id.
182
Leslie F. Goldstein, Original Meaning, Precedent, and Popular Sovereignty?: Whittington et al. v.
Lincoln et al., 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 783, 784 n.6 (2013) (“The new originalism makes a point of dropping
the older—circa 1970s to 1980s—emphasis on original (perhaps private) intention of the Framers
or ratifiers, and turning toward the original public meaning of the constitutional text or original public
understanding of the ratifying generation.”). According to Lawrence Solum, the origins of
“new originalism” can be traced to when Justice Scalia urged originalists to “change the label from
the Doctrine of Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning.” Solum, supra note 5, at 463 (quoting
Antonin Scalia, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Address Before the Attorney General's Conference on
Economic Liberties (June 14, 1986), reprinted in, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y,
ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK app. C at 101, 106 (1987)). The academic origins
of “new originalism” can be found in the works of H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of
Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985); Gary Lawson, Legal Theory: Proving the Law., 86 NW.
U.L. REV. 859, 874–75 (1992); and Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power
to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L. J. 541, 553 (1994). That tradition has continued with a wide range of
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Given this suggestion, one may fairly—but mistakenly—believe that our
journey is near its end, for Justice Scalia’s view on the Establishment Clause
and the Lemon Test are clear. He famously compared it to a “ghoul in a latenight horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad,
after being repeatedly killed and buried . . . .”183 As early as 1987 in Edwards
v. Aguillard, he argued that the Court should abandon the “secular purpose”
prong of the Lemon Test, although he provided no originalist argument in the
case.184 In Lee v. Weisman, he dissented from the view that “state-induced
‘peer-pressure’ coercion” offends the Establishment Clause.185 Rather,
only “coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law
and threat of penalty” would rise to that level, in his opinion.186 While he saw
no problem with the endorsement of religion generally and with privileging
believers over non-believers, he conceded that our constitutional tradition
would rule out of order cases “where the endorsement is sectarian, in the sense
of specifying details upon which men and women who believe
in a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world are known
to differ (for example, the divinity of Christ).”187 In his dissent in
McCreary County v. American Civil Liberty Union, however, he did not view
the King James version of the Ten Commandments as sectarian even though
there are many different versions of the Commandments held by different
religions and denominations, and of course, many religions that do not
recognize or endorse the Ten Commandments.188 In Lee v. Weisman,
he claimed to take an originalist approach, but his actual arguments in the case
had little to do with the substantive original public meaning of the Clause.189
There is no historical reference to what anyone, much less what most people
thought the Clause meant at the time of the Founding. Rather, his argument
in Lee, as in the later case of McCreary, is that the existence of historical
practices, such as prayers at public ceremonies, or the existence of religious
figures and abstract depictions of the Ten Commandments at the
Supreme Court, are to be taken as evidence that such practices do not offend
the Clause.190
scholars. See generally Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999);
Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004); Solum, supra note 5,
at 463; JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).
183
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398–99 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
184
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636, 640 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
185
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
186
Id.
187
Id. at 641.
188
McCreary Cnty. v. Am. C.L. Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 909 (Scalia, J., with Rehnquist, CJ., &
Thomas, J., dissenting). It was sufficient for Justice Scalia that the Ten Commandments were generally
accepted by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Further, because he did not think the sectarian disputes were
widely known, and because he did know of them, he did not view this as a sectarian. Id.
189
See generally Lee, 505 U.S. 577, 631–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190
Id. at 632–35; McCreary, 545 U.S. at 885–89 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Note the abstract artistic
rendering of the Ten Commandments at the Supreme Court does not contain the text of the Commandments
and it is set within the context of other depictions of lawgiving. Note also that the Supreme Court
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Unfortunately, appeals to our history and tradition, our practices
at the time of the Founding and beyond, tell us very little about whether those
practices were consistent or inconsistent with the original understanding
of the Clause.191 But further, as demonstrated above in Section VI,
the practice was not to embrace theism over atheism, or even as
Justice Scalia’s position in McCreary seems to suggest, “people of the book”
over those from other religious traditions.192 Rather, in most cases,
the practice and tradition was to embrace and privilege Protestants over
Catholics, Jews, Muslims, and Unitarians, not to mention Native Americans
and slaves.193
Although Justice Scalia, in practice, has let us down in our quest for
the original understanding of the Clause, we can still follow his spirit.
Justice Scalia himself acknowledged the difficulty of the task of sorting
through the historical record.194 Today, we have some tools that did not exist
during Justice Scalia’s lifetime, and there are some who think these tools
might help us discover the text’s original meaning. So, what if, unlike
Justice Scalia, we broaden our scope and conduct a search for that meaning
that is systematic and thorough, with a technique borrowed from linguistics
known as “corpus linguistics” that searches through meta-data. Might there
Courthouse was not built until the 1930s and so it is not clear that traditions that might have begun at that
time regarding the architectural design of the building are at all relevant to original understanding of
the Constitution. The Supreme Court did not have its own building prior to the 1930s but met in various
rooms in the Capital building. See, e.g., Homes of the United States Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, https://supremecourthistory.org/homes-of-the-supreme-court/ (last visited
July 3, 2022).
191
See Koppelman, supra note 15, at 733–40 (writing highly critically of Justice Scalia’s purported
originalist approach to the Establishment Clause). As Koppelman notes, Justice Scalia’s originalist
argument boils down to: “I have no idea what this provision means. But whatever it means, it cannot
prohibit this, because the Framers approved of it.” Id. at 737; see also Randy E. Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity:
A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 13–14 (2006) (“Justice Scalia is simply
not an originalist. Whatever virtues he attributes to originalism, he leaves himself not one but three
different routes by which to escape adhering to the original meaning of the text. These are more than
enough to allow him, or any judge, to reach any result he wishes. Where originalism gives him the results
he wants, he can embrace originalism. Where it does not, he can embrace precedent that will.
Where friendly precedent is unavailing, he can assert the nonjusticiability of clauses that yield results to
which he is opposed. And where all else fails, he can simply punt, perhaps citing the history of
traditionally-accepted practices of which he approves.”).
192
See discussion supra Section IV.ii.
193
See discussion supra Section V.
194
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856 (1989) (Justice Scalia
acknowledged the difficulties of applying originalism correctly in his Taft Lecture.).
[I]t is often exceedingly difficult to plumb the original understanding of an ancient
text. Properly done, the task requires the consideration of an enormous mass of
material—in the case of the Constitution and its Amendments, for example,
to mention only one element, the records of the ratifying debates in all the states.
Even beyond that, it requires an evaluation of the reliability of that material—many
of the reports of the ratifying debates, for example, are thought to be quite unreliable.
And further still, it requires immersing oneself in the political and intellectual
atmosphere of the time—somehow placing out of mind knowledge that we have
which an earlier age did not, and putting on beliefs, attitudes, philosophies,
prejudices and loyalties that are not those of our day. It is, in short, a task sometimes
better suited to the historian than the lawyer.
Id. at 856–57.
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be light at the end of this rather long and dark tunnel regarding the original
meaning of the Clause?
The corpus linguistics method searches large collections of digitized
sources from the given period to help understand the use and meaning of given
words or phrases.195 Stephanie H. Barclay, Brady Earley, and Annika Boone
were the first to use this approach to understand the original meaning of
the Establishment Clause.196 While they do not claim to conclusively resolve
the historical debate over the original meaning of the Clause, they do
claim to provide “probable answers” using new historical sources.197
Their approach is to search their databases containing material from the
period to see how frequently or infrequently certain coded characteristics can
be found in connection with the “establishment of religion.”198 Although they
do not claim that their findings are conclusive, they are extensive and,
if followed, would have a significant impact on our understanding of the
Clause and of its application to future cases.199 In their findings, “by far the
most common issue discussed in the context of an establishment of religion
involved legal or official designation of a specific church or faith.”200
Their findings also showed:
Other
common
characteristics
involved
[were]:
(1) government coercion of individuals with respect to
prohibitions or mandates on religious practices enforced by
legal penalties or government persecution; (2) government
interference with church affairs . . . ; (3) preferential public
support of the established church . . . ; and (4) restrictions of
civic or political participation to members of the established
church.201
What their data did not reveal, however, was “confirming evidence
for a number of current theories regarding the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause . . . .”202 They did not find any support for the view that
establishment of religion was implicated by any of the following:
(1) government religious displays; (2) Sunday closing laws; (3) prayer in
schools; (4) even-handed religious exemptions; or (5) preferential treatment
of religion over nonreligion.203
195

Barclay et al., supra note 101, at 508–09.
See generally id.
197
Id. at 509.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id. It is not surprising that school prayer did not come up because public schools as we know them
today did not exist at the time of the founding. See generally History and Evolution of Public Education
in the US, GEO. WASH. U.: CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y, https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED606970.pdf
(last visited June 14, 2022).
196
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Thus, they conclude that their results regarding common
characteristics are consistent with modern theories that see these
characteristics as “a necessary condition for an Establishment Clause
violation,” while their results do not support modern theories that “treat[] any
one of these characteristics as a sufficient condition for an Establishment
Clause violation.”204
They venture beyond these general statements to more pointed
statements regarding one recent and one pending Supreme Court case at
the time their findings were published.205 They argue that the only concern
with the display of religious symbols was when the government destroyed
the symbols and images of dissenting churches.206 They further claim that
this supports the decision in the American Legion case involving the
forty-foot Bladensburg Cross World War I Memorial.207 They further argue
that public support of religious organizations was not a problem unless
it was done “in a preferential way or as a means of leveraging government
control over internal church affairs.”208
They then assert that
the “Espinoza case may thus provide an important vehicle for the
Supreme Court to revise much of its current jurisprudence that is out of step
with a historical approach to analyzing the Establishment Clause.”209
Although the Supreme Court did not take up their scholarship in the Espinoza
case and has not taken it up elsewhere as of yet, three Circuit Court cases
address their scholarship.210
These are bold assertions, and so it is worth evaluating whether their
data justify these conclusions.211 Their search began in the Brigham Young

204

Barclay et al., supra note 101, at 509–10.
American Legion v. American Humanist Association, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019);
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).
206
Id. at 510.
207
Id. (The authors contend that “[t]he Court's recent American Legion decision was consistent
with this finding.”). The implication is that, since they could not find anyone complaining that
majority-endorsed religious symbols like the forty-foot Bladensburg Peace Cross raised Establishment
Clause problems, then it was not a problem. But, just because no one talked about symbols being
establishments, did not mean that government displays of those symbols in those states that had
establishments, were not part of the establishment, or were not at least “related” to those establishments.
208
Id.
209
Id. Note, no Supreme Court majority has endorsed the non-preferentialism approach endorsed by
these authors. In 1985, Chief Justice Rehnquist adopted the approach in his dissent in Wallace, but not so
much after that case. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91–114 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
The Court in Espinoza did not adopt the approach, but rather found that the no-aid provision discriminated
against religious schools and their families in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the
Federal Constitution. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Rev., 140 S.Ct. 2246, 2253–63 (2020). The problem,
according to the Court in Espinoza, was the discrimination on the basis of religion, and this was not saved
by a concern not to aid religion. Id. at 2259–61 (“But it is clear that there is no ‘historic and substantial’
tradition against aiding such schools comparable to the tradition against state-supported clergy invoked by
Locke.”).
210
Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 4 F.4th 910, 952 (9th Cir. 2021) (Ikuta, J., dissenting);
Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1104 (11th Cir. 2020) (Martin, J., dissenting); Napolitano v.
St. Joseph Catholic Church, 308 So. 3d 274, 279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020).
211
Note that the authors do provide a caveat to their research as they state:
205
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University’s J. Reuben Clark Law School’s Corpus of Founding-Era
American English (“COFEA”) and covered a wide range of digitized
materials from 1760 to 1799.212 According to the COFEA website, there are
126,393 texts in the collection with 136,915,894 words.213 The collection
contains “documents from ordinary people of the day, the Founders, and legal
sources, including letters, diaries, newspapers, non-fiction books, fiction,
sermons, speeches, debates, legal cases, and other legal materials.”214
When searching for the term “Establishment of Religion” in COFEA,
the authors only found eleven useful results.215 These are very scant results
for such a wide search of the term. But the authors were able to go wider
by searching the Corpus of Early Modern English (“COEME”).
This database includes 40,299 texts and 1,100,351,631 words from
1475 to 1800.216 With this more expanded search, the authors identified forty
useful references to the term.217 Again, forty references over the span of over
300 years is fairly thin. Thus, they expanded their search further in order to
see what words might appear six words to the right or left of “establish.” 218
This turned up 500 words. These were then narrowed by identifying only
those with a statistically significant relationship and those entries with some

In this particular context, our methodology cannot capture important historical
debates about the concept of an established church that did not actually use iterations
of the term establish, such as Patrick Henry’s Virginia Assessment Bill. Similarly,
while we were looking for specific discussions in the context of an establishment
that supported (or failed to support) various theories, some of these theories could
arguably find support if evidence is viewed at a much higher level of abstraction.
And while frequency data is useful in identifying the ordinary meaning of a term
and can help identify the scope of ability with respect to original understanding,
the data should be evaluated in context to determine which characteristics of
the word were communicated. Further, our results are underinclusive. For example,
consider the following hypothetical result: “Parliament selected the
Church of England's ministers.” This result would not be coded for some elements
of an establishment, such as individual coercion. That does not mean the established
Church of England did not involve individual coercion. It simply means that
characteristic was not discussed in that particular result.
Barclay et al., supra note 101, at 555.
212
Id. at 531.
213
About the Corpus, BYU Corpus of Founding Era American English (BYU-COFEA), BYU: LAW &
CORPUS LINGUISTICS, https://lawcorpus.byu.edu/cofea/concordances (last visited June 14, 2022)
[hereinafter Corpus].
214
Id. COFEA draws primarily from “the National Archive Founders Online; William S. Hein & Co.,
HeinOnline; Text Creation Partnership (TCP) Evans Bibliography (University of Michigan);
Elliot’s Debates; Farrand's Records; and the U.S. Statutes-at-Large from the first five Congresses.” Id.
However, the database has its limitations, because “[i]t is representative mostly of elite white male voices
of the founding era, and it does not have enough samples of some genres of the English language,
notably newspapers.” Barclay et al., supra note 101, at 532.
215
Barclay et al., supra note 101, at 538. Their search turned up thirty-three results, but twenty-one
of the thirty-three were simply quoting the phrase in the First Amendment with nothing more. Id. Nine of
the eleven results used the term to talk about a “legal or official designation of a specific church or faith
by a particular nation or colony.” Id.
216
Corpus, supra note 213.
217
Barclay et al., supra note 101, at 541. This was culled down from eighty-eight results. Id.
218
Id. at 545.
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religious connotation.219 This search resulted in just over twenty collated
words.
The authors found it “particularly interesting that no version of
the word endorse appeared anywhere in the COFEA database within six
words to the right or left of any iteration of establish.”220 This they take as
evidence “of an absence of any correlation,” which they find important in
light of some views of the Lemon Test.221 This finding could be particularly
important in light of modern conceptions of the Lemon Test that rely on some
sort of equivalence between establishment of religion and the idea of
government endorsement.
So, is this finally the evidence that we have been looking for that
Lemon is not justified by the historical record since it neither appears
in COFEA nor COEME?
If prayers in schools are not a problem, if endorsing religion is not
a problem, and if non-preferential aid is not a problem, then the Lemon Test,
which is contrary to all of these practices, would be a problem. Prayers do
not have a secular purpose (unless one takes a very cynical view of state
prayers), and neither does endorsing religion. Further, endorsing religion and
providing non-preferential aid to religion while excluding non-religious
institutions would have the primary effect of advancing religion and might
raise entanglement problems in some situations.222
Although the Supreme Court has not cited the authors, the majority
opinion of Justice Gorsuch in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District appears
to endorse their views.223 Justice Gorsuch labelled the Lemon approach
as “‘ambitiou[s],’ abstract, and ahistorical.”224 In place of the Lemon and
endorsement test, Justice Gorsuch argues that the “Establishment Clause must
be interpreted by ‘reference to historical practices and understandings.’”225
Justice Gorsuch went on to state: “‘[T]he line’ that courts and governments
‘must draw between the permissible and the impermissible’ has to
‘accor[d] with history and faithfully reflec[t] the understanding of the
219

Id.
Id. at 547.
221
Id.
222
Remember, the Lemon Test is as follows: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally,
the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’” Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (citations omitted).
223
—S. Ct. —, 2022 WL 2295034 (U.S. Jun. 27, 2022).
224
Id. at *13. The majority opinion of Justice Gorsuch did not engage any historical analysis, or cite
any historical analysis for the claim, but it did cite broadly to American Legion v. American Humanist
Assn., 588 U. S. ––––, ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2067, –––– (plurality opinion) and Town of Greece v. Galloway,
572 U.S. 565, 575–77 (2014). Although the majority opinion claims that the Court had abandoned
the Lemon test and its offshoot, the endorsement test, long ago, the Court had never explicitly overturned
Lemon, nor the endorsement test until the Kennedy decision. See id. at *13-14
225
Id. at *14 (citing Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 576, and American Legion, 588 U. S. at ––––,
139 S. Ct. at 2087 (plurality opinion).
220
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Founding Fathers.’”226 He further noted that although there has been
disagreement as to “what exactly qualifies as impermissible coercion in light
of the original meaning of the Establishment Clause” coercion “was among
the foremost hallmarks of religious establishments the framers sought to
prohibit when they adopted the First Amendment.”227
Although Justice Gorsuch cites James Madison for this view, he fails
to acknowledge that James Madison had argued that the history and tradition
of Congressional legislative prayer, which the Court used to justify
the practices in Marsh v. Chambers, and in Town of Greece, violated the
Establishment Clause.228 Contrary to the decision in Town of Greece, which
upheld the practice of sectarian prayers in town council meetings,
Madison found the sectarian practices of appointing protestant chaplains in
the House and Senate to be particularly problematic from the perspective of
religious freedom and equality. As he stated:
The establishment of the chaplainship to Congs. is a palpable
violation of equal rights, as well as of Constitutional
principles. The tenets of the Chaplains elected shut the door
of worship agst. the members whose creeds & consciences
forbid a participation in that of the Majority. To say nothing
of other sects, this is the case with that of Roman Catholics
& Quakers who have always had members in one or both
of the Legislative branches. Could a Catholic clergyman
ever hope to be appointed a Chaplain? To say that [his]
religious principles are obnoxious or that his sect is small,
is to lift the veil at once and exhibit in its naked deformity the

226
Id. (citing Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577) (quoting School Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
227
Id. at 14. Justice Gorsuch does not cite an impressive array of historical support for this claim.
In addition to citing his own recent opinion and the dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia in Lee v, Wiseman,
he cited 1 Annals of Cong. 730–731 (1789) (Madison explaining that the First Amendment aimed to
prevent one or multiple sects from “establish[ing] a religion to which they would compel others to
conform”); and M. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment
of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2144–2146 (2003). Id. at *29 n.5.
228
463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding Nebraska’s legislative prayers); 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
See James Madison, Detatched Memoranda, ca. 31 January 1820, FOUNDERS ONLINE, NATIONAL
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-01-02-0549. He writes:
Is the appointment of Chaplains to the two Houses of Congress
consistent with the Constitution, and with the pure principle of religious freedom?
In strictness the answer on both points must be in the negative.
The Constitution of the U.S. forbids every thing like an establishment of a national
religion. The law appointing Chaplains establishes a religious worship for the
national representatives, to be performed by Ministers of religion, elected by
a majority of them; and these are to be paid out of the national taxes. Does not this
involve the principle of a national establishment, applicable to a provision for a
religious worship for the Constituent as well as of the representative Body, approved
by the majority, and conducted by Ministers of religion paid by the entire nation.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Doctrine th⟨at⟩ religious truth is to be tested by numbers,
or that the major sects have a right to govern the minor.229
Thus, it is important to understand that recourse to historical practices
has little to nothing to do with original intent or the original public meaning
of the text. It is at best a distant cousin, and here, a very ugly distant cousin.
The history and tradition so celebrated by the Court in Town of Greece, and
presumably by Justice Gorsuch in Kennedy, was viewed by Madison to be
a tradition of discriminatory religious practices that violated the
Establishment Clause. Importantly these comments were not oblique
comments made about religious principles or early proposed drafts of the
Amendments or of the religion clauses, but are clear statements of
his considered views that the practices of Congress during the years following
the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1789, violated the Establishment
Clause. It is very doubtful Justice Gorsuch’s approach to the Establishment
Clause “faithfully reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers” as to
either the actual meaning of the Clause or to their approach to interpreting
the Clause.230
i.

Insufficient Data to Fill the Vessel

The authors’ have very scant evidence for their conclusions,
and some of the evidence is not on point.231 For instance, when talking about
government funding of religious schools, the authors appear to base their view
229

Id.
Quote referencing Justice Brennan’s concurrence in School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963). It might be argued that Madison adopted a historical practices
approach to settling the meaning of “obscure or equivocal” provision to the Constitution in Federalist 37.
See William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019). Whether the approach called
liquidation is the same as the historical gloss approach is debatable. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional Adjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753,
1775 (2015) (describing the historical gloss approach as closely related to liquidation). For the view that
Madison did not have a worked out theory of liquidation, see Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel,
Historical Gloss, Madisonian Liquidation, and the Originalism Debate, 106 VA. L. REV. 1, 59–72 (2020).
Some have argued that framers of our constitution endorsed originalist methods of interpreting the
Constitution. See, e.g., JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD
CONSTITUTION 116–38 (2013). Others have argued that there was considerable uncertainty as to how
to interpret the Constitution by both the Federalist and Anti-Federalist at the time of the Founding.
See JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE
FOUNDING ERA 116–23 (2018). For an earlier work arguing that the founding fathers were not originalists
in their interpretive outlook see H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent,
98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 948 (1985) (“It is commonly assumed that the ‘interpretive intention’ of the
Constitution's framers was that the Constitution would be construed in accordance with what future
interpreters could gather of the framers' own purposes, expectations, and intentions. Inquiry shows that
assumption to be incorrect. Of the numerous hermeneutical options that were available in the framers'
day—among them, the renunciation of construction altogether—none corresponds to the modern notion of
intentionalism”).
231
Lawrence Solum supports this kind of work as part of triangulating original meaning, namely, using
“corpus linguistics, immersion, and the constitutional record to discover the original public meaning of
the constitutional text.” Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics,
Immersion, and the Constitutional Record, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1621, 1677 (2017). As we will see, if we do
some triangulating, the corpus linguistics approach used by Barclay et al., does not help us zoom in on any
specific original public meaning of the text. See infra notes 182–221 and accompanying text.
230
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on comments regarding the established church in England, as they state,
“When a concern did arise regarding religious schools, it involved a law that
only allowed members of an established church in England to teach
in schools, and that prevented parents from sending their children to
a religious school that was consistent with the parents’ religious beliefs.”232
It is hard to see how these comments shed any light on the question of the
meaning of the Establishment Clause. England’s establishment was very
different from the various forms of establishment in the United States.233
When they turn to funding more generally, Barclay et al. argue that
financial support alone did not capture the “characteristic associated with
an establishment” but rather that discussion of establishments only occurred
when the funding was “offered to the established church in a preferential
way.”234 They provide three entries as support for this view.235 One was in
a pamphlet by Thomas Bradbury Chandler; the second was in a passage in
the American Whig contrasting the state of religion in England to that in the
United States; and the third consisted of statements by Rhode Island Pastor
Ezra Stiles.236 When read in context, these entries do not support the authors’
findings.
The first entry and the quote taken from that entry are taken out
of context. Contrary to the authors’ views, the quote does not support the idea
that only preferential aid is an establishment. The quote reads:
[A]n established religion is a religion, which the civil
authority engages, not only to protect, but to support; and
a religion that is not provided for by civil authority, but which
is left to provide for itself, or to subsist on the provision it has
already made, can be no more than a tolerated religion.237
The quote, by its very language, does not distinguish between preferential
support and general support when discussing what counts as an establishment.
The language equates establishment with “protection and support.”
But further, if one turns to the pamphlet and reads the section that it comes
from, one will note that Chandler is arguing against those who are critical of
Canada’s tolerance of Catholics; he is responding to those that hold the view
that the treatment of Catholics in Canada amounts to an establishment.238
He is referring to Catholics after the semicolon. The quote is written in
a postscript, where he states, “ Since the greatest part of this Address was
232

Barclay et al., supra note 101, at 510.
DISESTABLISHMENT AND RELIGIOUS DISSENT, supra note 51, at 12–13.
Barclay et al., supra note 101, at 550.
235
Id. at 550–51.
236
Id.
237
Id. at 550 (quoting THOMAS BRADLEY CHANDLER, A FRIENDLY ADDRESS TO ALL REASONABLE
AMERICANS, ON THE SUBJECT OF OUR POLITICAL CONFUSIONS 55 (N.Y., James Rivington 1774) (1974)
(on file at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/)).
238
CHANDLER, supra note 228, at 55.
233
234
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printed off, the papers published by the Congress have come to hand; in which
they say, that ‘the Roman Catholic Religion, instead of being tolerated,
as stipulated by the treaty of peace, [between France and England] is
established’ by the Act.”239 The focus here is not on the discrimination against
Catholics and in favor of Anglicans amounting to an establishment, but
whether the Act that allowed Catholics to raise their own revenue in the
colony was an establishment. In the paragraph proceeding the quote, he notes
that the King “compl[ied] with the reasonable expectations and requests of
the Canadians, in allowing the Clergy to enjoy their wonted support,
under certain restrictions and limitations. But this indulgence by no means
converts the stipulated tolerations into an establishment, as the Gentlemen of
the Congress are pleased to assert.”240 Here, he is talking about the law that
allowed the Catholic Church to receive tithes from its parishioners. In the
paragraph after the quote, he argues that this amounts to the mere tolerance
of Catholics and does not amount to an establishment.241 He ends
the paragraph arguing: “If, after all, men will confound the meaning of words,
and make no distinction[s] between toleration and establishment, they
degrade themselves into the rank of quibblers and praters, and it is loss of time
to dispute with them.”242 Yet, it appears that just a few years before our
Declaration of Independence, members of the Canadian Congress took the
view that merely allowing the Catholic Church to raise funds from
its parishioners through tithing amounted to an establishment, and it also
appears that the idea had enough traction that Chambers felt he needed to
respond in this postscript.243
Thus, while some may have taken the view that only preferential aid
was an establishment, others, at the time, took the view that tolerance of
religion was an establishment.244 While Chambers may have the better view
that tolerance for Catholics was not an establishment, clearly important
people in the Canadian Congress did not share his view. If tolerance of
religion were thought to be an establishment by some, then surely
endorsement would be.245 The passage from Chambers cannot be read as
supporting the view that only preferential support for religion was an
establishment. Chambers nowhere says that. But this still leaves two entries.
239

Id. at 53.
Id. at 55.
Id.
242
Id.
243
Thomas Bradbury Chandler, A Friendly Address, 1774, in THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION:
WRITINGS FROM THE PAMPHLET DEBATE, II: 1773–1776 285 (Gordon S. Wood ed., N.Y.: Libr. of
Am. 2015).
244
It is interesting that the authors did not find “tolerance” or “toleration” within six words
of “establishment;” “toleration” and “establishment” are separated by only one word, “and,” on page fiftyfive of Chamber’s work. See CHANDLER, supra note 243, at 55.
245
Note that I am not arguing that the original meaning of the term “establishment of religion” includes
tolerance of religion, but this view has about as much support in the materials found by Barclay et al.
as their preferred reading of those materials.
240
241
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The second entry merely contrasts the English establishment, which
required dissenters to maintain the established clergy, with the practice
in New England at the time, wherein each denomination had to maintain its
own clergy.246 Again, while it is clear that England had an established church,
the passage does not contrast preferential support in England with
non-preferential support in New England but instead contrasts preferential
governmental support in England with no governmental support in
New England.
The third and final entry from Pastor Ezra Stiles states that
“[i]n Marylland [sic] and Virgina [sic] it is episcopacy [that is established],
with appropriations of large revenue from tobacco for the established
clergy only.”247 After quoting Ezra Stiles, Barclay et al. state, “In contrast,
we did not find any examples of more neutral forms of government financial
support for religious organizations, such as even-handed tax exemptions,
being discussed as a characteristic of establishment.”248 But as with the entry
from Chambers, if the authors had just read from the beginning of the section
written by Stiles, just a little over a page before the language they quote, they
would see that Pastor Stiles himself believes that colonies that provide nonpreferential support to religion are considered religious establishments.249
In the section in question, he is conducting a survey of the religious
establishments in the British provinces at the time to see “what particular sect
is most friendly to the public liberty.”250 As he states:
Where all sects are equally established there is properly
no toleration, all partaking in the benefit of the
establishment. Where one sect is invested with power to
enforce taxes on themselves for the support of their clergy,
and all others exempted from such tax, there is a true and
proper toleration, but perfectly easy as such dissenters are
exempted from ministerial taxes. Where the established
clergy are supported by a branch of provincial revenues
appropriated, and dissenters are not exempted from
contributing, and yet share no part of such appropriation,
such dissenters are tolerated in the lowest sense, viz. on
condition of their payment to the established clergy. And it
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Barclay et al., supra note 101, at 550; The American Whig, No. XV, PARKER’S N.Y. GAZETTE,
(June 20, 1768) reprinted in A COLLECTION OF TRACTS FROM THE LATE NEWS PAPERS, & C. 241 (N.Y.,
John Holt, 1768) (on file at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/).
247
Barclay et al., supra note 101, at 550–51 (quoting EZRA STILES, A DISCOURSE ON THE CHRISTIAN
UNION 99 (1760) (on file at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/)).
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Id. at 550–51.
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STILES, supra note 247, at 98–99.
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may so happen that the same sects may be established,
or dissenters in different provinces.251
While later he makes it clear that Virginia and Maryland are examples
of preferential establishments, he starts out by talking about the situation
in which all sects are established.252 As he states in the sentence just
preceding the language quoted by Barclay et al., “The religious establishment
of the Jersies and Pensylvania is universal liberty as in Rhode-Island.”253
He then continues,
From this view it appears, that in virtue of the religious
establishment in the three provinces of Pensylvania,
the Jerseys and Rhode-Island, there are no dissenters, but
all enjoy the same common immunities . . . . But the happy
policy of establishing one sect without infringing theessential
rights of others is peculiar to the three New England
provinces, where congregationalism is the establishment.254
Further, if we do some more triangulating, we find there is evidence outside
these corpora that important actors during the founding era not only
considered general, “non-preferential” assessments in support of religion to
be establishments, but also found them to be problematic.255
ii. The Wrong Vessel: The Clause Reads, “Respecting an
Establishment of Religion,” not “Establishment of Religion”
As noted above, it is not surprising that there is no evidence in the
corpora that prayer in public schools posed an establishment problem in
the United States because public education did not exist at the time of the
Founding. Further, while it might be mildly surprising that “endorsement”
does not appear within six words of “establish” within the over one billion
words in the database, what is most surprising to discover is that the actual
text of the First Amendment Establishment Clause was not found by
the authors.256 More specifically, their search did not turn up the word
“respecting” in connection with “establishment,” or at least not enough for
it to make the list.257 The authors never even mention the term. When they
251

Id. at 99.
Id. at 99–100.
Id. at 100.
254
Id.
255
As noted by Donald Drakeman, not only did Madison—who was opposed to general assessments—
consider general assessments as an establishment, but so did Theodore Sedgwick, who supported
Massachusetts’s general assessments. DRAKEMAN, supra note 9, at 236–37. But further, as we saw in
the House debate, Huntington was concerned that the House proposal, which was not clearly limited to the
federal government, might also forbid Connecticut’s general assessment. Id. at 224–25. Further,
as Douglas Laycock reminds us, not only did Virginia and Maryland reject non-preferential aid to religion
in 1786 and 1785, but so did the Senate when drafting the Clause. Laycock, supra note 132, at 878.
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point out the need for more meta-data research regarding the Establishment
Clause at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment, they again do not call
for research on the language of the Clause. As they state,
In addition, further historical and corpus linguistics
research is needed to evaluate the public meaning
of “establishment of religion” during the Reconstruction
period, and particularly surrounding the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Since that Amendment has been
interpreted to incorporate the Establishment Clause to
the states, further inquiry into how public understanding of
“establishment of religion” had evolved, if at all, by that time
period could shed further important light on the meaning of
the Clause.258
I find it curious that they appear to have no interest in researching the actual
text of the Clause, either at the time of the Founding of the First Amendment
or at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment, and no interest in how the public
understanding of “respecting an establishment of religion” might have
evolved.
When I conducted a search for the collocate “respecting” within
six words left and right of “establishment” in COEME, it turned up nineteen
entries.259 While most of the entries are not really on point, one or two are
arguably relevant. Some of them are, perhaps, as relevant as the materials
discovered by Barclay et al., but as we will see, they are really not all that
useful. None of them turned up the phrase “respecting an establishment
of religion” before Congress adopted the proposed Amendment. In their own
right, they tell us very little about the original understanding. Because they
are just a very few of the dots in the sky, or pebbles of sand on the beach,
there is no way to tell if they are in any way representative of the views
of the founding generation.
Eight of the nineteen entries simply listed or quoted the Amendment
or Clause without any comment. Five entries preceded the ratification of the
Amendment. Three of the five have nothing to do with an establishment
of religion and provide very little insight into the words’ meaning. The other
two simply listed the Amendments as proposed by Congress without
comment. Only one entry potentially came in between the time of the drafting
and its ratification, and it had nothing to do with the Amendment or Clause
but concerned someone’s established views. It reads, “Now this was
258

Id.
“Respecting” within six words left and right of “establishment”, BYU-Corpus of Early Modern
English (BYU-COEME), BYU: LAW & CORPUS LINGUISTICS, https://lawcorpus.byu.edu/byucoeme/
concordances;q=establishment;cq=respecting;left=6;right=6;field=concordance%3BtextId.%3Byear%3B
genre%3Bsource (last visited June 14, 2022).
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so directly the reverse of the truth respecting my establishment in favour of
infant baptism, that I could not be easy, nor answer a good conscience herein,
to let it pass unnotic’d.”260 Several subsequent entries were also off point,
for example, “respecting the establishment of his Head-Quarters”;
“respecting the establishment of the National Bank by Congress”; “respecting
the establishment of such troops as may be deemed indispensable . . . .”261
There was some substance to an entry in a 1793 book by
Jedidiah Morse, A.M., in the The American Uuniversal Geography.262
This author appears to view the religion clauses as working toward a complete
separation of church and state when after quoting the religion clauses,
he states:
In this important article, our government, is
distinguished from that of every other nation, if we except
France. Religion here, is placed on its proper basis; without
the feeble and unwarranted aid of the civil power, it is left
to be supported by its own evidence, by the lives of its
professors, and the Almighty care of its Divine Author.263
His use of the term “religion” also does not seem to distinguish believers from
non-believers. As he further states:
All being thus left at liberty to choose their own religion, the
people, as might easily be supposed, have varied in their
choice. The bull of the people would denominate themselves
Christians; a final proportion of them are Jews; some plead
the sufficiency of natural religion, and reject revelation
as unnecessary and fabulous; and many, we have reason to
believe, have yet their religion to choose.264
There was an entry from 1795 that recites the religion clauses in the
context of Quaker conscientious objections to taking up arms.265 The next
entry from 1798 addressed the Alien and Sedition laws, arguing that
the regulation of speech and press were reserved to states and the
First Amendment provision meant that “libels, falsehoods, and defamation,
260
ISRAEL HOLLY, THE NEW TESTAMENT INTERPRETATION OF THE OLD, RELATIVE TO INFANT
BAPTISM, AS A SPECIAL GROUND THEREOF, AND WARRANT THEREFOR 5 (1771) (on file at
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/).
261
PHILLIP JOHN SCHUYLER, THE PROCEEDINGS OF A GENERAL COURT MARTIAL 4 (1778) (on file
at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/); JAMES WILSON, CONSIDERATIONS OF THE BANK OF NORTH-AMERICA 7
(1785) (on file at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/); GEORGE WASHINGTON, A COLLECTION OF THE SPEECHES
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 28 (1796) (on file at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/).
262
JEDIDIAH MORSE, THE AMERICAN UNIVERSAL GEOGRAPHY (1789) (on file at
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/).
263
Id. at 252.
264
Id.
265
Letter from one of the Society of Friends, Relative to the Conscientious Scrupulousness of
its Members to Bear Arms (1795) (on file at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/).
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equally with heresy and false religion, are withheld from the cognisance of
federal tribunals.”266 The last two entries are from the same publication
in 1800, and both address the Freedom of Speech and Press Clauses in light
of the Alien and Sedition Act.267
What is to be made of these entries? More perhaps could be said
of Jedidiah Morse, A.M., who not only fathered the co-inventor of the
single-wire telegraph and the Morse code, but was also known as the father
of American geography.268 One could perhaps even write a whole book on his
religious views, given that he was also a minister who “throughout his
life . . .was much occupied with religious controversy, and in upholding the
faith of the New England church against the assaults of Unitarianism.” 269
But would any of this really make one more confident that we understood
what the text meant or did not mean at the time of the Founding? Does it help
make the case that the father of American geography seemed to take
a Jeffersonian view of the Clause? Although the authors’ search must have
turned up some of this evidence with respect to the actual language of the
Clause, they did not find it either relevant or significant enough to even
mention it.
It is not clear that I, or the authors who searched these two corpora,
actually found anything new or particularly enlightening despite their bold
findings. As Drakeman pointed out in 2010, we already have most of these
resources, and there simply is not much there. As he noted, “We know with
a fairly high degree of confidence what most people were saying about the
establishment clause at the time it was adopted and ratified: nothing.”270
If anything, the search of these corpora supports this conclusion more than
they support any of the findings by Barclay et al.
Thus, if we want to critique how the Court has filled the vessel we
call the Establishment Clause, it is more honest to admit that the Framers used
novel language that did not have a common established meaning at the time
of the Founding. If the various historical authors surveyed in this Article
could not provide us with a convincing common understanding of the term
“establishment of religion” in the debates, in the Gentleman’s Agreement, or
in the corpora, our chances of finding a common understanding of the phrase
266

THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS, AND VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS. PUBLISHED
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under Federal law, COPYRIGHT NOTICES, Mar. 2015, at 12–13, https://www.copyright.gov/
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“respecting an establishment of religion” is unrealistic. There are two reasons
for this: First, the modifier “respecting” enlarges the scope of the phrase
“establishment of religion,” which is already vague on its own. The phrase,
even without the “respecting” language, was read by some at the time of
the Founding to include not just preferential support of religion, but also
non-preferential support of religion and even, by some, tolerance of Catholic
tithings, while for others only something akin to the Church of England would
count. Second, as we saw, prior to the adoption of the First Amendment,
there simply is no recorded use of the expression at all and only scant mention
of the text of the Clause after. Thus, we have little to nothing in the historical
record to guide our understanding of the actual text. Therefore, the rule
constructed in Lemon fits the historical record as well as its rivals, although,
admittedly, this says very little.
The reader may be disappointed that at the end of this journey we
have not uncovered something more concrete and specific in the historical
record that would tell us if the standard that was constructed in Lemon
either goes too far in separating the state from religion or does not go far
enough. The original public meaning of the text is as vague and open
to numerous conflicting interpretations as the views and intentions of
the Founders and Framers. Thus, it is more honest, more faithful to the
“original understanding” to let go of the illusionary shackles of history.
While the broad contours of the vessel the Framers gave us can still guide us,
it is not a faithful reading of the text they gave us to pretend they somehow
intended future generations to be limited to some set of more specific and
determinate constructions that the Framers or their generation would have
endorsed. Rather, it is a more natural and faithful reading of the text to imply
that the Framers intended to avoid more specific language and more
specific commitments when they adopted the broad principled language.
As Ronald Dworkin stated long ago, “The clauses are vague only if we take
them to be botched or incomplete or schematic attempts to lay down particular
conceptions. If we take them as appeals to moral concepts they could not
be made more precise by being more detailed.”271
iii. What Does One Do When Originalism Does not Provide a
Determinate Meaning?
What does one do when the originalist quest for determinate meaning
seems to run out? New originalists provide different answers to this question,
but the past is no longer the sole or determinative guide to the future.
Some scholars have taken the view that in the absence of clear meaning, the
judges should employ constitutional default rules. Thus, Gary Lawson has
271
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 136 (Harvard. Univ. Press rev. ed. 1978) (1977)
(footnote omitted).
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argued that “[i]n the event that there is any uncertainty about what this
Constitution means in any specific application, resolve the uncertainty against
the existence of federal power and in favor of the existence of state power.”272
In our case, this would effectively un-incorporated the Establishment Clause.
Michael Stokes Paulsen’s default rule, which also requires deference to
the political branches when the Constitution is vague, does not clearly
distinguish between state and federal power.273 As he states:
The more unspecific a text, the more room it leaves for
democratic choice, in accordance with the structures of
government the Constitution creates at the federal level and
mostly leaves alone at the state level. If the Constitution’s
text supplies no rule or standard governing the issue
in question, the issue defaults to some other source of law or
the designated authority of some decisionmaker who
otherwise possesses policy discretion with respect to that
issue. Where the document’s broad or unspecific language
admits of a range of possible actions, consistent with the
language, government action falling within that range is
not unconstitutional.274
Taken to its logical conclusion, this would work as an amendment to
the Constitution, effectively removing the Clause. Given the pervasive
vagueness of the text, this would make much of the Bill of Rights a dead
letter.275 As Lawrence Solum argues, these default rules are based on
normative consideration and are not required by the semantic content of the
constitutional text, by any logical implication of the text, nor even by any
contextual enrichment of the text’s semantic content.276 As Solum notes,
there are multiple baselines grounded in our constitutional tradition that could
supply the presumption, be it (1) a presumption of judicial authority
to construct rules when the text is vague, irreducibly ambiguous, or
indeterminate; (2) a presumption of liberty in these situations, where we
presume that the conduct of individuals is lawful; or (3) Paulson’s
presumption that legislation and executive action in these situations are
constitutional.277
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Other new originalists like Randy Barnett argue that justices are
obliged to construct the Constitution in these cases, that is, to create more
particular rules to give effect to vague or abstract provisions because these
provisions delegate that authority to justices.278 Lawrence Solum argues that
construction is ubiquitous and occurs anytime the constitutional text is given
effect.279 He further argues that construction is “essentially normative” and
that there may be a broad range of normative approaches to constructing rules
to give effect to the text when it is vague, ambiguous, or otherwise
indeterminate.280 Here, the text of the Establishment Clause sets out a rather
vague and open-ended principle. Jack Balkin argues that unless we have
strong evidence to the contrary—and based on the analysis above,
we do not—we should assume that the Framers chose general language,
abstract principles, and/or open standards in order to give effect to general
principles.281 If they had intended a more specific meaning or commitment
to more specific principles, then they could have avoided that commitment by
using specific language.282 For Balkin, originalism requires that we are not
only faithful to the original meaning of the constitutional text but its
underlying principles.283
Further, the original meaning is not the same as the original expected
application of the text.284 The question is not what would the Framers have
[o]f course, arguments of political morality can be advanced for each of
the competing baselines.
One could argue (1) for the presumption
of constitutionality on the basis of popular sovereignty, (2) for the presumption of
liberty based on a classical liberal (or contractarian) theory of justice, or (3) for the
presumption of judicial authority based on an argument for the institutional
competence of the courts. But these are normative arguments about the best
construction and not linguistic arguments about communicative content. Putting
this point just a bit differently, the presumption of constitutionality posited by
Originalist Thayerianism requires a normative justification, and this fact strongly
suggests that a principle of Thayerian deference is a construction and not
an interpretation of the constitutional text.
Id. at 521.
278
See Barnett, supra note 35, at 265. Barnett goes on to argue that
when two constructions are equally consistent with the original meaning of the text,
I have arguedthat courts should favor constructions that enhance the legitimacy of
the Constitution. By “constitutional legitimacy” I mean that quality or qualities that
enable a legal system to issue laws that bind in conscience those upon whom they
are imposed.
It is easy to imagine, however, that many choices among competing
constructions are both equally consistent with original meaning and not clearly
preferable on grounds of legitimacy.
Id. at 265.
279
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280
Id. at 472–73.
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493 (2007).
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Id. at 493.
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Id. at 427.
284
Balkin notes that conservative originalists will sometimes conflate original meaning with original
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cases will simply call for the latter. Id. at 453. Balkin notes that Scalia does this in the case of the
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expected the text to imply, but rather what does the meaning of the enacted
text and its underlying principles imply—and this is particularly true when
the language chosen by the Framers is broad and abstract. Contrary to those
who believe that the open language of the Bill of Rights should be read
to delegate as little as possible to the future, Balkin argues that the broader
the language, the more broad the delegation.285 The Framers knew how
to draft specific provisions and clear rules, and some parts of the Constitution
that are written this way provide little room for future courts to exert their
discretion in constructing rules.286 As Balkin states:
The “whole purpose” of constitutions cannot be simply
to forestall political judgment by later generations on
important issues of justice, to preserve past practices of social
custom or judgments of political morality, or to freeze
existing assessments of rights in time. When we view these
open-ended rights provisions together with the more rule-like
structural features of constitutions, we can see that they serve
a somewhat different goal. They are designed to channel and
discipline future political judgment, not forestall it.287
Thus, for Balkin, rather than freezing the Constitution in time, the decisions
the Framers made in the past provide structure for the decisions that will
be made in the future so that our Constitution may “adapt itself to changing
circumstances in ways that promote fairness, justice, political stability and
other goods of political union.”288 Whether the Lemon Test fits that bill is
another paper.
The Court in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District decided to
overturn Lemon v. Kurtzman just as this article was about to be sent off
to press.289 However, given that a majority of the current Court does not have
much regard for settled precedent, Lemon may someday rise again.
Whether the resurrection will appear as a “phoenix from the ashes” of the wall
that used to separate church from state, or as a “ghoul in a late-night horror
movie” depends on complicated moral assessments of the consequences of
the Court’s current jurisprudence. While the Catholics on the Supreme Court
might view themselves and other mainstream religions as the beneficiaries
of a torn down wall, I would hope that they remember that founders like
argue that we should use original expected application to define the scope of
constitutional principles so that they produce results that conform to the original
expected application . . . . But to adopt this method is essentially to reinstitute a new
form of expectations originalism under the guise of original meaning.
Id. at 453 (citing McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 275, at 378–79).
285
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286
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Madison viewed the wall as crucial to protecting the equal rights of not only
persecuted minority religions, in particular Catholics at the time, but also
those “whose creeds & consciences forbid a participation in that of the
Majority.”290

290
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